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Consequences of Nationality in
American Law
MICHAEL TERRY HERTZ*
Nationality plays its principal role in immigration matters, but
it has been put to significant uses in other areas of American law.
This article focuses on the consequences of application of the na-
tionality concept in constitutional law, civil rights legislation,
taxation, and securities regulation. The author examines the
functions which nationality has been required to fulfill and as-
sesses the concept's capacity for accomplishing assigned legal
tasks. He criticizes overbroad uses of nationality as a legal regu-
lator but finds that the concept can play a useful, though re-
stricted, role in some areas.
The late Professor Bickel, commenting on the impact of nation-
ality in constitutional law, remarked that "happily ... the con-
cept of citizenship plays only the most minimal role in the
American constitutional scheme .... Citizenship is at best a
simple idea for a simple government."' He disagreed with Chief
Justice Warren who proclaimed, "Citizenship is man's basic right
for it is nothing less than the right to have rights. '2 Bickel
thought that the most significant American freedoms are ac-
corded regardless of citizenship and that, constitutionally, citizen-
ship is largely irrelevant. Chief Justice Warren thought that only
citizenship guarantees untrammeled access to American terri-
tory3 and enjoyment of the rights which this nation offers. With-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law. BA., Po-
mona College, 1967; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1970.
1. Bickel, Citizenship in the American Constitution, 15 Ansz. L REV. 369, 387
(1973).
2. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting); accord,
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 267-68 (1967).
3. Worthy v. United States, 328 F.2d 386, 394 (5th Cir. 1964). But see United
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out citizenship, entry to and residence in the United States can be
barred on virtually any grounds.4 Both views are valid. Unen-
cumbered congressional power over alien immigration makes citi-
zenship the key to avoiding the Byzantine labyrinth of American
immigration laws. On the other hand, citizenship does not entail
significantly greater access to basic constitutional rights.
Immigration aside, nationality continues to play an important
role in American law. Of course, nationality is not as significant
here as it is in Europe, where private law rights and remedies are
linked to citizenship status.5 Still, despite erosion of state law
power over the consequences of nationality, citizenship continues
to be a significant factor, particularly in federal legislation and
certain aspects of constitutional law. Recent developments
demonstrate the vitality of citizenship as a determinant of mat-
ters of substance.
How relevant is or should nationality be in defining the scope of
legal rights and obligations? When citizenship is relevant to a
particular legal scheme, then it is legitimate to make a given rule
applicable to citizens but not to aliens. In those situations there
States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475, 481 (1967) (citizen entry from Cuba without U.S. pass-
port could be made illegal).
4. Recent cases upholding exclusionary classifications that would be highly
questionable in other contexts include Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (excluding
illegitimate offspring of American fathers but not those of American mothers) and
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (excluding temporary entry of Marxist
speaker despite arguments that first amendment permitted U.S. residents to hear
him). See also Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (deportation be-
cause of political affiliation).
5. E.g., the application of divorce laws. Trautman, The Role of Conflicts
Thinking in Defining the International Reach of American Regulatory Legislation,
22 Omao ST. LJ. 586, 603 (1961). See generally Silving, Nationality in Comparative
Law, 5 Am. J. CoMP. L. 410 (1956).
An intriguing example is Simons v. United States, 452 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1971).
The plaintiff and her late ex-husband were Dutch by birth and became naturalized
Americans in 1948, two years after their marriage. They then left the United
States until 1962, when the plaintiff commenced separation proceedings in New
York. She broke these off after she obtained a rapid Mexican divorce. In 1968 the
husband died. The plaintiff wife then brought an action to have the original natu-
ralization declared void on the grounds that it was illegally procured. "Her
avowed purpose was to place herself in a position where Dutch law would govern
their status and the legality of the Mexican divorce, the hope being that this would
be declared invalid and that she would thereby become entitled to share in [the
husband's] estate." Id. at 1112. Presumably, Dutch law would look to American
nationality as determining the validity of the divorce and find that American law
would recognize the validity of the Mexican divorce, something that Dutch law
might not do if the spouses were Dutch and that law directly regulated the validity
of a Mexican divorce. Dutch law must have looked to New York law if the citizen-
ship of the husband and wife remained American, as only a few American jurisdic-
tions would recognize a consensual Mexican divorce. See Perrin v. Perrin, 408 F.2d
107 (3d Cir. 1969); Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262
N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 971 (1966).
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is a functional relationship between citizenship and the kind of
obligation to be imposed or the benefit to be accorded. When
there is no such direct relationship, there are still times when the
"governmental purpose... can fairly call upon citizens for a dif-
ferent standard of conduct than from others .... -"6 Conversely,
the factor of foreign nationality may inhibit the application of
American law in the absence of strongly overriding principles.7
Nationality indicates an individual's relationship to a given
state and signifies membership in a political community.8 That
relationship may attach involuntarily by birth within the jurisdic-
tion 9 or to citizen parents;10 by conquest, treaty," or annexation;12
or by voluntary action through naturalization.13 In some in-
stances, a person may actually exercise the rights of citizenship
while lacking de jure nationality,14 and in others he may have citi-
zenship without exercising the rights thereof or even realizing
that he is entitled to do so. 1 5 As a standard for attaching legal
consequences, nationality may thus be too broad or too narrow.
Under these circumstances, although international law recognizes
a state's right to base legal obligations upon citizenship,16 this
country correctly makes limited use of that jurisdictional basis.
Moreover, when according basic rights, the spirit of equality has
come to regard citizenship as irrelevant, except when allegiance,
the primary characteristic of nationality, strongly justifies a dis-
tinction along citizenship lines.
Citizenship itself probably does affect the behavior of persons
who have it. Citizenship undoubtedly instills in citizens greater
loyalty towards American institutions and greater incentive to
6. Trautman, The Role of Conflicts Thinking in Defining the International
Reach of American Regulatory Legislation, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 586, 610 (1961).
7. Id. at 603, 610.
8. E. BORCHARD, THE DirmoATIc PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 7 (1915).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
10. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (3) (1976).
11. Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 162 (1892).
12. United States ex rel. Schwarzkopf v. Uhl, 137 F.2d 898, 902 (2d Cir. 1943).
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (1976).
14. United States v. Lucienne d'Hotelle, 558 F.2d 37, 43 (1st Cir. 1977) (use of
American passport estopped holder from denying citizen's tax obligations); Joyce
v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [1946] A.C. 347 (H.L.) (noncitizen holder of Brit-
ish passport could be charged with treason).
15. Benitez Rexach v. United States, 390 F.2d 631 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, 393
U.S. 833 (1968) (de jure citizenship alone was adequate basis for taxation).
16. RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 30 (1965).
preserve and foster American traditions.'7 Moreover, the legal
consequences that attach to citizenship or noncitizenship may
justify consequences that might not be independently supporta-
ble: if noncitizens can be deported, then noncitizens might be de-
nied the right to participate in activities requiring guaranteed
permanence within society. Noncitizenship may also affect rela-
tions between this country and other nations. American rules
governing noncitizens may be used in negotiating rights for Amer-
ican citizens abroad.18 Finally, roles played by noncitizens within
the United States may have an impact upon citizens' views of pol-
icies connected with those roles. Government may have to con-
sider such views when making decisions for an orderly society.'9
Although the preceding effects of citizenship are enumerable,
their weight may be slight or uncertain in many instances. One
must generally conclude that they should be given limited consid-
eration in fashioning policy, except when directly applicable. In
particular, a citizenship test for conferring domestic benefits
should be employed only for compelling reasons. However, once
the decision has been made to establish such a test, the manner
in which it will be interpreted or constitutionally reviewed may
vary greatly. The judiciary, which has the final task of reviewing
many such tests, must investigate the relationship between the
purpose for the citizenship requirement, the qualities attaching to
citizenship supporting it, and the nature of the body formulating
the rule in order to determine how the factor of citizenship will be
handled. The succeeding sections of this article will explore the
uses and misuses of nationality as a legal dividing line in Ameri-
can law.
CrIZENSHIP AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
Historically, nationality has been used as a label for separating
the privileged from the deprived. At common law, aliens could
neither participate in the political process nor hold public office. 20
They could not take land by act of the law, and although their title
17. Cf. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 299-300 (1978) (citizens may have
greater familiarity and sympathy with American traditions); United States v.
Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972, 976-77 (5th Cir. 1975) (same); Perkins v. Smith, 370 F.
Supp. 134, 141 (D. Md. 1974) (Winter, J., concurring) (same), afrd, 426 U.S. 913
(1976).
18. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 104 (1976).
19. See text accompanying notes 99-101 infra.
20. At least in its early history, American rules appear to have been somewhat
more lenient than English law. See Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection Why
not the Right to Vote?, 75 MIcH. L. REV. 1092, 1093-1100 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Voting]. The English and Commonwealth approaches are described in Rex v.
Heighton (No. 1), 69 D.L.R. 386, 393-96, 55 N.S.R. 512, 523-25 (Can. 1922).
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to land taken by purchase or devise was good against third per-
sons, the Crown could cause it to be forfeited at any time through
appropriate proceedings. Alien-owned lands were not inheritable
but would escheat to the Crown upon the holder's death.21 Alien
friends did have the capacity to sue or be sued,22 although enemy
aliens did not.
2 3
Statutes, generally on the state level, increased these disabili-
ties to burden alien participation in economic and social activi-
ties.24 "The range of state statutes limiting aliens' access to
trades or professions has been extraordinarily broad."25 These
statutes prevailed even in the face of exclusively federal immigra-
tion policies which, in general, did not impose disabilities on
aliens once they were admitted for permanent residence.2 6
Although the fourteenth amendment has been held applicable
to aliens since 1886,27 state power over alien participation in local
activities was largely unlimited until 1948 and was not uncontest-
ably truncated until the early 1970s. Although the cases have run
strongly in favor of aliens since 1971,28 the most recent Supreme
Court decisions halted the unanimity of the trend and leave un-
certain the degree to which nationality may be utilized by the
states as a regulatory basis.29
21. Morrison, Limitations on Alien Investment in American Real Estate, 60
MmN. L. REV. 621, 623 (1976); Spender, The Alien Landowner in Canada, 51 CAN.
B. REV. 389, 390 (1973).
22. Daubigny v. Davallon, 2 Anst. 462, 467, 145 Eng. Rep. 936, 937 (Exch. 1794);
accord, Disconto Gesellschaft v. Terlinden, 127 Wis. 651, 658, 106 N.W. 821, 822
(1906), affd, 208 U.S. 570 (1908). See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
23. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 776 (1950).
24. For a sampling of employment restrictions under state law, see Note, Con-
stitutionality of Restrictions on Aliens' Right to Work, 57 COLUm. L, REV. 1012, 1021-
22 (1957).
25. H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 45 (2d ed. 1976).
26. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish &
Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948).
In fact, since 1870 federal law has provided: "All persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory ... to
the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons
and property as is enjoyed by white citizens." 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) (originally
enacted as the Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144).
27. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
28. E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), and cases cited in notes 68
& 72.
29. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291
(1978). See also Perkins v. Smith, 426 U.S. 913 (1976), aFfg 370 F. Supp. 134 (D. Md.
1974).
The following issues are related to the problem of the constitu-
tional limits of state power over resident aliens:
(1) Limits on state discrimination against nonresident aliens
(2) Constitutional limits on federal power over resident aliens
(3) Federal constitutional rights which extend to nonresident
aliens
(4) Federal legislation governing discrimination by individuals
against aliens.
State Power Over Resident Aliens
Until 1948 constitutional law permitted the states broad latitude
in discriminating on the basis of alienage. Details of the early
cases have been developed elsewhere.30 Here they are discussed
only to indicate the development of constitutional weapons
against state alienage legislation.
The Court first applied fourteenth amendment equal protection
in favor of aliens in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.31 A San Francisco ordi-
nance prohibited laundries in certain kinds of buildings, unless
consent had been given by the city board of supervisors. Nondis-
criminatory on its face, the ordinance was applied solely against
laundries owned and operated by Chinese. The Supreme Court
struck down the unequal application of the statute, as "no reason
for it exists except hostility to the race and nationality to which
the petitioners belong."32
Aliens bore the burden of proving "hostility" as the motivating
factor for discriminatory legislation, and the Court assisted them
only in obvious instances such as Yick Wo. In Patsone v. Penn-
sylvania,33 the defendant alien had been prosecuted for owning a
shotgun, contrary to state law making it unlawful for an alien "to
kill any wild bird or animal except in defense of person or prop-
erty and 'to that end' [made] it unlawful for such [alien] to own
30. See generally Griffith, Some Rights and Disabilities of Aliens, 2 OHio N. L.
REV. 613 (1975); Rosales, Resident Aliens and the Right to Work: The Quest for
Equal Protection, 2 HAsTnGS CONST. L.Q. 1029 (1975); Rosberg, The Protection of
Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by the National Government, 1977 Sup. CT.
REv. 275, 293-98 [hereinafter cited as Protection]; Note, Aliens' Right to Teach: Po-
litical Socialization and the Public Schools, 85 YALE L.J. 90 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Teaching].
31. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
32. Id. at 374. Although "nationality" might be read to refer to national origin
and not alienage, the Supreme Court has not done so. See Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (analogizing Yick Wo's holding as to race in sug-
gesting that equal protection concepts undermine discrimination on national ori-
gin basis).
33. 232 U.S. 138 (1914).
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... a shotgun. '34 The Court, in finding that the discrimination
did not violate equal protection, held that the prohibition of
aliens' use of shotguns was a reasonable means by which to con-
serve wildlife for state citizens, a legitimate state purpose. The
state lawmakers were permitted to decide "that resident unnatu-
ralized aliens were the peculiar source of the evil that it desired
to prevent" 35-that is, the slaughter of wildlife-as opposed to
other persons not citizens of the state.
For similar reasons, states had the power to prohibit alien em-
ployment on public works projects3 6 or in public service.3 7 It was
only when a state attempted to exclude aliens from virtually all
gainful employment that the Court struck down the law. In Truax
v. Raich,38 the legislation did not pertain to "the regulation or dis-
tribution of the public domain, or of the common property or re-
sources of the people of the State."39 The state could, therefore,
point to no "special public interest" to justify the general prohibi-
tion of alien employment and had to indicate specific reasons for
such wholesale exclusion beyond a broad declaration that such
employment imperiled the public welfare. On the other hand,
when the state sought to prohibit alien leasing of farm land, the
state was allowed to control "the privilege of owning or control-
ling agricultural land within the State. The quality and allegiance
of those who own, occupy, and use the farm lands within its bor-
ders are matters of highest importance and affect the safety and
power of the State itself."40
Similarly, the state could prevent an alien from operating a
poolhall, which the Court qualified as a "business of dangerous
tendencies."41 The Court did not expressly limit state regulation
to such "dangerous" businesses and did not state when regulation
of individual classes of businesses might lead to the result forbid-
den in Truax v. Raich.42
34. Id. at 143.
35. Id. at 144.
36. Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915).
37. Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915).
38. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
39. Id. at 39.
40. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 221 (1923).
41. Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 397 (1927).
42. See Protection, supra note 30, at 296 (explaining Truax in terms of freedom
of contract principles).
Reliance on treaties was generally to no avail. 43 In only one
case was an alien able to convince the Court that his business,
pawn-brokering, was a "trade" within treaty language permitting
Japanese in the United States "to carry on trade . . .upon the
same terms as native citizens or subjects."4 4 A similar argument
was rejected when the relevant treaty protected "commerce," as
the Court felt that the "owner of a [poolhall] does not necessarily
buy, sell, or exchange merchandise or otherwise participate in
commerce."45 The pawnbroker's case was distinguished as involv-
ing a business concerned with merchandise as security and "the
sale of merchandise when necessary to realize on the security."46
Although Truax v. Raich did not directly involve the exclusive
federal power over immigration and naturalization, the Court
there utilized the existence of that exclusive power as a means of
limiting the basis upon which the state law could be justified.47 In
Hines v. Davidowitz,48 the Court used federal legislation as a
means, through the supremacy clause, of preventing the opera-
tion of state legislation. The Court found enforcement of a Penn-
sylvania statute requiring the registration of aliens foreclosed by
the federal Alien Registration Act of 1940, which, together with
the immigration and naturalization laws, formed a comprehensive
and integrated scheme for the regulation of aliens. 49
43. See, e.g., Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923); Crane v. New York, 239
U.S. 195 (1915); Helm v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232
U.S. 138 (1914).
44. Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 340 (1924).
45. Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 396 (1927).
46. Id.
47. Although the naturalization and immigration powers are exclusively fed-
eral, "every state enactment which in any way deals with aliens is [not] a regula-
tion of immigration and [not] per se preempted by this constitutional power,
whether latent or exercised." De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976) (absent
congressional action, state law prohibiting hiring of illegal aliens did not trans-
gress federal authority).
48. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
49. Pennsylvania's law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. And in that de-
termination, it is of importance that this legislation is in a field which af-
fects international relations, the one aspect of our government that from
the first has been most generally conceded imperatively to demand broad
national authority ... And it is also of importance that this legislation
deals with the rights, liberties, and personal freedoms of human beings,
and is in an entirely different category from state tax statutes or state
pure food laws regulating the labels on cans .... When [Congress] made
this addition [of alien registration] to its uniform naturalization and immi-
gration laws, it plainly manifested a purpose to do so in such a way as to
protect the personal liberties of law-abiding aliens through one uniform
national registration system, and to leave them free from the possibility of
inquisitorial practices and police surveillance that might not only affect
our international relations but might also generate the very disloyalty
which the law has intended guarding against.
Id. at 67-68, 74.
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Although federal preemption of a field is not lightly inferred,
the strength of the inference varies with the subject matter. In ar-
eas traditionally associated with state power, federal law ousts
state legislation only if that is the "clear and manifest purpose of
Congress."5 0 But when the subject matter is national, "the Court
is more vigilant in striking down state incursions into subjects
that Congress may have reserved to itself."S1 Hines v. Davido-
witz52 marked the Court's willingness to turn federal litigation
into a sword against discriminatory state practices as well as the
beginning of the erosion of state power over aliens.
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission,5 3 the first direct attack
on state alien laws, relied primarily on the equal protection
clause5 4 but also included the supremacy clause.5 5 The California
Fish and Game Code had banned the issuance of fishing licenses
to any '"person ineligible to citizenship." Only the Japanese re-
mained ineligible as a national group. The Japanese petitioner
was denied a license to fish off California and commenced pro-
ceedings to compel issuance. California argued that the state law
fell within the rationale of the "special public interest" upheld in
the earlier cases: the law reduced the number of commercial
fishermen and conserved fish for its citizens. Denial of licenses
only to aliens ineligible to citizenship was reasonable because
California was simply following the federal naturalization classifi-
cation.
The Supreme Court held for the alien petitioner. Discrimina-
tion by the federal government against petitioner's class in natu-
ralization did not authorize the states to discriminate for wholly
different purposes. The federal government has exclusive power
to regulate naturalization, and the states "can neither add to nor
take from the conditions lawfully imposed by Congress upon ad-
mission, naturalization and residence of aliens in the United
States."56 The state could rely only upon its "ownership" of off-
shore fish to justify discrimination. Without overruling Patsone,5 7
the Court nevertheless found such "ownership" too "slender a
50. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
51. L TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrIrIONAL LAw 386 (1978).
52. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
53. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
55. Id. art. VI, § 2.
56. 334 U.S. at 419.
57. Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914).
reed" to justify the exclusion of the Japanese from fishing when
all others were permitted.5 8 "Assuming the continued validity of
[the alien land cases],"59 the Court found them limited to the pe-
culiar institution of real property.
Thereafter, the highest courts in three Western states struck
down alien land laws as violations of the fourteenth amend-
ment.60 However, it was not until 1969 that California took the
lead in ending state prohibitions against public employment of
aliens. Relying on both federal immigration legislation and four-
teenth amendment equal protection, the California Supreme
Court declared that the state could not deny aliens the right to
employment on public works projects.61 The Supreme Court of
Washington agreed with respect to municipal employment, 62 and
the federal district court for the Virgin Islands, applying "equal
protection" notions inherent in fifth amendment due process to
the island government, held unconstitutional discrimination
against aliens in the availability of public educational resources. 63
In 1971 the Supreme Court returned to the issue of state dis-
crimination against aliens, reviewing welfare cases in which
states had imposed nationality restrictions on eligibility for wel-
fare assistance. The Court in Graham v. Richardson64 used both
equal protection and the supremacy clause in reasoning that the
58. 334 U.S. at 421.
59. Id. at 422. Just prior to Takahashi, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948),
distinguished on narrow grounds one of the older land cases, Cockrill v. California,
268 U.S. 258 (1925). California law voided transfers of real property to persons in-
eligible for citizenship and established a presumption of intent to evade the law if
the land was held in the name of an eligible person but the consideration for the
transfer was paid by an ineligible person. Cockrill had upheld the presumption
under due process and equal protection attacks that focused on discrimination
against the alien who had paid the consideration. In Cyama, title was held by the
alien's six-year-old, American citizen son. The Court ruled that the law unconsti-
tutionally discriminated against the son because it presumed that he was holding
the land in trust for his parent, a presumption which would not be made if the par-
ent were an alien eligible for citizenship. 332 U.S. at 641. Four of the seven jus-
tices voting to strike down the law would have reexamined Cockrill and overruled
it.
60. Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952); State v. Oakland, 129
Mont. 347, 287 P.2d 39 (1955); Kenji Namba v. McCourt, 185 Or. 79, 204 P.2d 569
(1949). The Supreme Court has never overruled the alien land cases, although it
would doubtless do so if the occasion presented itself. Lowe, The Arizona Alien
Land Lav': Its Meaning and Constitutional Validity, [1976] Amiz. ST. L. J. 253, 272,
Morrison, supra note 21, at 644, Sullivan, Alien Land Laws: A Re-evaluation, 36
TEim. L.Q. 15, 53 (1962).
61. Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P.2d 645, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77
(1969).
62. Hsieh v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 79 Wash. 2d 524, 488 P.2d 515 (1971).
63. Chapman v. Gerard, 341 F. Supp. 1170 (D.V.L 1970), affid, 456 F.2d 577 (3d
Cir. 1972). See also Williams v. Williams, 328 F. Supp. 1380 (D.V.I. 1971) (deport-
able alien must be given access to divorce court).
64. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
[voL 17: 37, 1979] Consequences of Nationality
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
laws were unconstitutional. For the first time, the Court declared
that "classifications based on alienage, like those based on nation-
ality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial
scrutiny."65 The state relied on the "special public interest" doc-
trine favoring local citizens over aliens in the distribution of lim-
ited state resources. The Court, however, noted the doubt that
Takahashi had cast on the continuing vitality of the doctrine, as
well as rejection of the "right/privilege" distinction upon which
citizenship-based discrimination is grounded. "There can be no
'special public interest' in tax revenues to which aliens have con-
tributed on an equal basis with the residents of the State."66 As
an independent basis, the Court found that Congress had pro-
vided in immigration legislation for the exclusion of aliens who
are or are likely to become public charges, but had not imposed
any burden on aliens who became indigent after entry. The state
restrictions impermissibly encroached on exclusive federal
power.67
Graham loosed a torrent of lower court decisions, almost all
ruling against local ordinances or statutes discriminating against
aliens.68 Then, in 1973, the Supreme Court applied Graham's
equal protection reasoning in In re Griffiths69 to end a state prohi-
bition against the practice of law by aliens and again in Sugarman
v. DougallO to end a state prohibition against employment of
aliens in the state civil service. The Court specifically noted in
Dougall that it was not holding
that a State may not, in an appropriately defined class of positions, re-
quire citizenship as a qualification for office ... [as] "[e]ach State has
the power to prescribe the qualifications of its officers and the manner in
which they shall be chosen...." Such power inheres in the State by vir-
tue of its obligation... "to preserve the basic conception of a political
community. .. ." And this power and responsibility of the State applies
65. Id. at 372.
66. Id. at 376.
67. Id. at 380.
68. E.g., Sailer v. Tonkin, 356 F. Supp. 72 (D.V.L 1973) (compensation under
Criminal Victims Compensation Act); Lopez v. White Plains Hous. Auth., 355 F.
Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (eligibility for public housing); Arias v. Examining Bd.
of Refrig. & Air Cond. Tech., 353 F. Supp. 857 (D.P.R. 1972) (air conditioning techni-
cian's license); Mohamed v. Parks, 352 F. Supp. 518 (D. Mass. 1973) (municipal em-
ployment); Teitscheid v. Leopold, 342 F. Supp. 299 (D. Vt. 1971) (state
employment); Raffaelli v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal. 3d 288, 496 P.2d 1264,
101 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1972) (bar admission); People v. Rappard, 28 Cal. App. 3d 302,
104 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1972) (possession of concealable firearm).
69. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
70. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
... [to] officers who participate directly in the formulation, execution, or
review of broad public policy [,] perform[ing] functions that go to the
heart of representative government. 71
Although the courts continued to end state limitations on alien
participation in various economic and social activities, 72 they be-
gan to examine matters that could be said to involve "the basic
conception of a political community."73 Aliens could, of course, be
denied the right to vote in a state election.74 But what of a local
school election?75 What of participating in jury duty?76 The Dou-
gall dictum opened a fresh field of inquiry and fresh difficulties.
The Supreme Court followed the Graham line of cases in strik-
ing down a Puerto Rico law licensing only citizens as private engi-
neers77 and a New York law limiting disbursement of educational
scholarships to citizens. 78 It found its first explicit application for
the Dougall exception in a statute providing that "[n]o person
shall be appointed to the [state] police force unless he shall be a
citizen of the United States." 79 Foley v. ConnelieO characterized
the Court's earlier decisions as involving "exclusions [which]
struck at the non-citizens' ability to exist in the community, a po-
sition seemingly inconsistent with the congressional determina-
71. Id. at 647.
72. The following cases are illustrative of the range of decisions: (1) Profes-
sions: Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976) (civil engineer);
Surmeli v. New York, 412 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y.) (physician), aft'd, 556 F.2d 560
(2d Cir. 1976); Wong v. Hohnstrom, 405 F. Supp. 727 (D. Minn. 1975) (pharmacist).
(2) Occupational Licenses: Arizona State Liquor Bd. v. Ali, 550 P.2d 663 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1976) (liquor license); Sundram v. City of Niagara Falls, 77 Misc. 2d 1002, 357
N.Y.S.2d 943 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (taxi driver license), aifd, 44 App. Div. 2d 906, 356
N.Y.S.2d 1023 (1974).
(3) Public Employment: Mendoza v. City of Miami, 483 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1973);
C.D.R. Enterprises v. Board of Educ., 412 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), affid, 429
U.S. 1031 (1977).
(4) Education: Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (scholarships); Moreno v. Uni-
versity of Md., 420 F. Supp. 541 (D. Md. 1976) (tuition; uses due process clause);
Jagnandan v. Giles, 379 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Miss. 1974) (tuition), afd on other
grounds, 538 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977); Buckton v.
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 366 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Mass. 1973) (sports regu-
lations).
(5) Miscellaneous: Frolov v. Delo, 86 Misc. 2d 485, 383 N.Y.S.2d 470 (Sup. Ct. 1976)
(hunting and fishing licenses).
73. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972).
74. Park v. State, 528 P.2d 785 (Alaska 1974).
75. Skafte v. Rorex, 553 P.2d 830 (Colo. 1976) (constitutionality upheld), appeal
dismissed, 430 U.S. 961 (1977).
76. Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (D. Md. 1974) (constitutionality upheld),
aO-d, 426 U.S. 913 (1976).
77. Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976).
78. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
79. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 215(3) (McKinney 1972).
80. 435 U.S. 291 (1978). See also Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 427 F. Supp. 158 (C.D.
Cal. 1977), judgment vacated, 436 U.S. 901 (1978).
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tion to admit the alien to permanent residence." 81 Although the
Court would treat "certain restrictions on aliens with 'heightened
judicial solicitude,"' not every statutory exclusion of aliens would
have to "clear the high hurdle of 'strict scrutiny,' because to do so
would 'obliterate all the distinctions between citizens and aliens,
and thus depreciate the historic values of citizenship.' "82
The Foley Court thus shifted the post of police officer into a
category in which "[t] he State need only justify its classification
by a showing of some rational relationship between the interest
sought to be protected and the limiting classification."83 In find-
ing a lesser need to justify a citizenship requirement for this oc-
cupation than for others, the Court reasoned that
the exercise of police authority calls for a very high degree of judgment
and discretion, the abuse or misuse of which can have serious impact on
individuals .... A policeman vested with [his] plenary discretionary
powers... is not to be equated with a private person engaged in routine
public employment or other "common occupations of the community"
who exercises no broad power over people generally .... In short, it
would be as anomalous to conclude that citizens may be subjected to the
broad discretionary powers of noncitizen police officers as it would be to
say that judicial officers and jurors with power to judge citizens can be
aliens. It is not surprising... that most States expressly confine the em-
ployment of police officers to citizens, whom the State may reasonably
presume to be more familiar with and sympathetic to American traditions.
Police officers very clearly fall within the category of "important nonelec-
tive ... officers who participate directly in the... execution. . . of broad
public policy .. ." In the enforcement and execution of the laws the po-
lice function is one where citizenship bears a rational relationship to the
special demands of the particular position. 8 4
Facially, the issue in Foley is whether or not a policeman falls
within the Dougall exception. If he does, strict scrutiny is not re-
quired and the law is constitutional. The reasons advanced by the
Court are minimally rational ones for a citizenship test. If, on the
other hand, the policeman were to be treated as the lawyer was in
Griffiths, strict scrutiny is not satisfied. As the Foley dissent indi-
cates, relying on the Dougall exception requires inquiry into
whether policemen directly participate "in the formulation, exe-
cution, or review of broad public policy."8 5 It is hard to disagree
with Mr. Justice Stevens when he argues that front-line police-
81. 435 U.S. at 295. This characterization refers to an interweaving of equal
protection and supremacy clause arguments found in earlier cases. See Protection,
supra note 30, at 315-16. Foley, however, is purely an equal protection case.
82. 435 U.S. at 295.
83. Id. at 296.
84. Id. at 298-300.
85. Id. at 310 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 729
men have nothing to do with policy-making, even in its execu-
tion.86 At least one Justice decided that he could not reconcile
Gmffiths, Foley, and the Dougall exception and concurred be-
cause of doubts about earlier decisions in which he had joined.8 7
In the term after Foley, the Court again reversed a federal
court8 8 which had struck down a New York alien law.89 Ambach v.
Norwick9O sustained legislation denying noncitizens the right to
teach in public elementary and high schools. "The decisions of
this Court regarding the permissibility of statutory classifications
involving aliens have not formed an unwavering line over the
years," the Court reported.9 ' Reviewing those decisions up
through Foley, the majority found that "[t] he distinction between
citizens and aliens ... is fundamental to the definition and gov-
ernment of a State."92 Governmental functions may be reserved
for citizens. And the role of the public school teacher, like that of
the policeman, "'gofes] to the heart of representative govern-
ment' -93 by virtue of "the role of public education and.., the de-
gree of responsibility and discretion teachers possess in fulfilling
that role."94
Before engaging in a strictly doctrinal analysis of the cases, let
us reexamine the justifications for the exclusion of aliens from
employment as policemen or teachers.95 Take three persons born
in Mexico, who lived there until age twenty-one and then in the
United States for five years. One may remain a Mexican citizen;
one may be a recently naturalized American; and one may be an
American from birth. Citizenship is not a convincing test for the
traditions, heritage, or training that each has received, for they
may be very much the same. One can, of course, argue that the
citizen from birth is more likely to know about American tradi-
tions than the noncitizen, but then what of the newly naturalized
citizen? His experience in the United States is no greater than
(1973) (lawyer not "so close to the core of the political process as to make him a
formulator of government policy").
86. 435 U.S. at 310.
87. Id. at 300 (Stewart, J., concurring). He found no such difficulties in
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979), joining in the opinion of the Court.
88. Norwick v. Nyquist, 417 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
89. N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 3001(3) (McKinney 1970).
90. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
91. Id. at 72.
92. Id. at 75.
93. Id. at 75-76 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)).
94. Id. at 75 (citing Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297 (1978)).
95. Forbidden justifications include treating public employment as a resource
limited to state citizens, Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 635-45 (1973), or impos-
ing a citizenship limitation to encourage naturalization, Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432
U.S. 1, 9-11 (1977).
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that of his noncitizen counterpart. Although it is true that citi-
zens as a class are more likely to be familiar with American lan-
guage, customs, and laws than aliens as a class, those attributes
vary so widely among the members of each class that the overall
conclusion is suspect.96 The paramount feature of citizenship is
that it is perhaps our best measure of the immeasurable 97 quality
of personal commitment to America and its values.98
Regardless of whether alienage fairly stands as a hallmark for
lack of knowledge about American political customs and mores, a
state may view the lack of personal commitment to the customs
and mores from two perspectives. First, other members of the lo-
cal community may react negatively to the fulfillment of a particu-
lar role by an alien. General knowledge that noncitizens are
policemen may cause a negative public reaction to all policemen
of foreign descent and reduce their effectiveness as symbols of an
orderly society.9 9 Then, too, lack of personal commitment to
American ideals by individual aliens may undermine police au-
thority with the public. To be effective role models for their stu-
dents, teachers must also be esteemed. 0 Although the Supreme
Court has uniformly held that "the State's need or desire to en-
gender political support for its ... programs cannot by itself jus-
tify an otherwise invidious classification,"'01 the right of the state
to employ a classification in defining a function vital to the secur-
ity of the local political community differs from a purported right
to justify an otherwise impermissible classification in distributing
social and economic benefits.
96. Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134, 139-40 (D. Md. 1974) (Winter, J., concur-
ring), a fd, 426 U.S. 913 (1976). See also Voting, supra note 20, at 1117-25 (citizen-
ship constitutionally inadequate measure of familiarity with language and
knowledge for vote denial). Contra, United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972,
976-77 (5th Cir. 1975) (quoting Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. at 138; semble, famili-
arity with custom measured by citizenship); Teaching, supra note 30, at 105.
97. 370 F. Supp. at 141 (Winter, J., concurring).
98. Id. at 140-42; Voting, supra note 20, at 1126-27 (acceptance of values). Cf.
Karst, The Supreme Cour 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1977) (citizen as responsible
member of society).
99. Cf. Teaching, supra note 30, at 104 (alien teacher's attitude may have nega-
tive impact on political socialization of students). See also Hall, Police and Law in
a Democratic Society, 28 INn. LJ. 133, 156 (1953) (public support essential to police
effectiveness).
100. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 78-79 (1979).
101. Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 391 n.24 (1978).
Accord, Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 266 (1974). See also
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226 (1971).
Secondly, both the policeman and the teacher, to perform their
jobs properly, must appreciate the values important to the Ameri-
can system, must integrate themselves into that system by adopt-
ing American habits and customs, and must be loyal to and
sacrifice personal interests for that system. The noncitizen may
have the same knowledge concerning these matters as a citizen,
but he may lack the motivation that citizens have to appreciate,
integrate, and sacrifice. These are difficult criteria for a mechani-
cal investigative process to weigh, and yet they are important.
Therefore, local authorities may be justified in using citizenship
as a hallmark for these attributes.
Emphasis on the public's negative reaction to an alien's fulfill-
ment of a given role and on that alien's ability to discharge duties
inherent in that role derives from the argument that the particu-
lar function is intertwined to such an extent with the concept of a
political community that, to the extent that citizenship is relevant
in defining the latter, it may be used to define eligibility for the
former. To make the argument, though, one must examine the
"concept of a political community" 0 2 and its relationship to citi-
zenship.
The states have no control over the definition of federal citizen-
ship. Why, therefore, may they utilize federal citizenship as a de-
fining rule for determining participation in local political life?
Take the right to vote in a state election. Although that right is
fundamental, the Supreme Court will not require the showing of a
compelling state interest to sustain voting restrictions based on
bona fide residence, age, and citizenship. 0 3 The same is undoubt-
edly true of high public office.' 0 4 It has been argued that if alien-
age is a suspect category, the state should not only be required to
submit the denial to review under strict scrutiny but should also
be required to show a compelling interest for denying the vote. If
the critical factor of constitutional "suspectness" is political
powerlessness, runs the argument, then "the invalidation of a
statute that excludes the members of a suspect class from partici-
pation in the political process is itself a way of eliminating...
102. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 344 (1972).
103. Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 297 (1975); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 349
(1972). See also Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 11 (1977) (citizenship); Skafte v.
Rorex, 430 U.S. 961, 961 (1977), dismissing appeal from 553 P.2d 830 (Colo. 1976)
(citizenship).
104. See, e.g., Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211 (D.N.H.) (three judge court)
(seven-year residency requirement for governor upheld), a f'd, 414 U.S. 802 (1973);
id. at 1218-19 (Campbell, J., concurring) ("compelling interest test" not necessarily
appropriate with respect to residency duration for high office).
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the need for strict scrutiny."'105 The argument, however, is circu-
lar, relying on the prohibited practice to support its own invalida-
tion.106 Moreover, it fails to recognize that citizenship, like age
and residence, may play an indispensable, though not easily
quantifiable, 0 7 role in defining eligibility for participation in a po-
litical community.
Popular rule, which Americans consider to be the very essence
of their political communities, assumes at a minimum that the
voter has sufficient understanding and maturity to consider mat-
ters presented for his decision and that he has a sufficient nexus
to the community concerned to partake in decisionmaking. Age
and bona fide residence' 08 are used as factors with respect to
these concerns. They are not subject to attack under the "com-
pelling state interest" test even though neither is closely tailored
to meet the problems addressed, because both provide "the best
available way of drawing a boundary for purposes of the
franchise."109 Citizenship may play a subsidiary role with respect
to the understanding of issues,1 10 but if that were its only role it
would be obviously deficient. Yet the state can utilize the criteria
of federal citizenship as a factor for establishing political partici-
pation.
Reference to federal citizenship would appear to be sufficiently
adapted to defining certain state political functions because local
political entities bear an important relationship to our national
whole. The locale is part of the national community, and adher-
ence to national purposes and interests affects political decision-
making at all levels. A local school board official may be faced
with questions involving the political socialization of school chil-
dren,"' or a local water board member may have to deal with al-
location problems having regional or national impact. Loyalty to
the national body is thus relevant to the local body politic. Citi-
105. Voting, supra note 20, at 1105-06.
106. L. TnmE, AMERICAN CONsTrrurIoNAL LAW 1053 (1978).
107. Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134, 141 (D. Md. 1974) (Winter, J., concur-
ring), af'd, 426 U.S. 913 (1976).
108. Such bona fide residence in a state constitutes state "citizenship." U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
109. L TRrBE, AMERICAN CONsTrIrIoNAL LAW 766 (1978) (referring to resi-
dence).
110. See note 96 supra.
111. Cf. Teaching, supra note 30, at 99-105 (instilling American values a state in-
terest).
zenship is the only yardstick available by which to measure loy-
alty with any degree of realistic efficiency.
Citizenship can therefore be used to define the right to partici-
pate in functions of a local political community. But any close ex-
amination of the reasons for that conclusion ultimately confronts
our inability to measure certain human qualities and perceptions
and our need for an arbitrary concept, "citizenship," to take ac-
count of them. The "special significance" that the Norwick
majority finds in citizenship1 2 justifies limits to the participation
of noncitizens, but the ultimate questions are "how much signifi-
cance?" and "how much limitation?" Those questions cannot be
answered merely by showing that the term enjoys multiple men-
tion in the Constitution.113 The fact that one must be a citizen to
hold certain constitutional offices does not measure the scope for
which the status may be used in defining eligibility for other of-
fices. It is through an understanding of the concept's importance
to the framers of the Constitution that one can determine the
ramifications that it should be accorded. The preceding examina-
tion of citizenship demonstrates that it has qualities which should
be given only limited weight.
Given the limited practical meaning of citizenship, the concept
of "governmental function" which is used to test a citizenship re-
quirement should be narrowly circumscribed. Even in that light,
Foley was a difficult case and the result defensible. But Norwick
is riddled with hair-splitting distinctions and needlessly expands
the Dougall exception.
In Gifflths the Court decided that aliens may not be barred
from becoming lawyers; Foley held otherwise for policemen. As
the Foley dissenters placed heavy emphasis on the difficulty in
distinguishing the two cases,1 14 a comparison of the cases will test
the preceding analysis. If one looks first at the attitude that
112. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75 (1979).
113. Id. (citing Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 651-52 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing)). The distinction has significance with respect to certain public offices, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2, cL. 2 (representatives), art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (senators), art. H, § 1, cl. 5
(President); voting rights, amends. XV (equality on basis of race), XIX (sex),
XXIV (abolishing poll tax), XXVI (age); judicial authority, art. HI, § 2, cl. 1 (au-
thority over both U.S. and foreign citizens), amend. XI (limiting authority over ac-
tions against states); and congressional authority, art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (naturalization).
It is also used to define enjoyment of privileges and immunities, art. IV, § 2, cl. 1,
amend. Xiv, § 1. The latter have limited constitutional significance. See 413 U.S.
at 652 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Cf. Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n,
436 U.S. 371 (1978) (access of nonresidents to hunting in state not protected by
privileges and immunities clause). The only other constitutional consequences of
citizenship involve constitutional offices and the vote.
114. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 306 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at
308 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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others have toward the role, it is clear that the policeman symbol-
izes the state. The private lawyer, although technically an "officer
of the court,"u 5 is not to the public a representative of the state or
even a primary symbol of law in society. He is a private profes-
sional, whereas the policeman is a public servant. Looking then
at the importance of American tradition in fulfilling this role, one
can argue, as did the Court,16 that policemen have peculiar dis-
cretion with strong impact upon individuals over whom they exer-
cise authority when they operate outside the direct control of
higher officials. In contrast, lawyers acting on their own authority
merely advise; when exercising functions likely to have the most
severe impact on our traditions, they operate under the scrutiny
of judges and other authorities.
Many of the above arguments may appear to apply to the public
school teacher. However, the New York education law is both
over and underinclusive and for that reason should have been
found to deny equal protection."17 First, New York applied its citi-
zenship rule only to public school teachers and not to private
school teachers who performed identical functions. The majority
argued that "the State has a stronger interest in insuring that the
schools it most directly controls, and for which it bears the cost,
are as effective as possible in teaching these courses."1 8 But if
the role of teachers in "influenc [ing] the attitudes of students to-
ward government, the political process, and a citizen's social re-
sponsibilities ... is crucial to the continued good health of a
democracy,""19 the stated distinction between public and private
schools appears irrelevant. Second, the rule applies to all teach-
ers, whether or not they are concerned with courses connected
with the politicization process. The Court emphasized that all
New York teachers may be called upon to teach such subjects, 20
but that should not justify the inclusion of all teachers in the pro-
hibited group unless the state can demonstrate that they do, in
fact, tend to teach them. Although teachers function as role mod-
115. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 723, 728-29 (1973).
116. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. at 297-99. See also Hall, Police and Law in a
Democratic Society, 28 IND. UJ. 134, 155 (1953) (police must understand own lim-
ited function, as opposed to broader powers of foreign police).
117. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 86-87 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 78 n.8.
119. Id. at 79. See id. at 86 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 80.
els of civic virtue for students,121 many other persons do as well.
If a public school gym teacher must be a citizen, then what of a
village playground director? Or a state park ranger whose princi-
pal occupation is guiding children on nature walks?122
Taken alone, Foley suggested no more than the extension of the
Dougall exception to the unique role of policeman. Norwick, go-
ing much further, points toward the progressive encroachment on
Dougall's opening of public employment to aliens. If public edu-
cation and the police function are fundamental obligations of gov-
ernment and if teachers and police have the requisite
responsibility and discretion, the Dougall exception threatens to
engulf Dougall itself. Firefighters, public health officers, inspec-
tors of every type, and any middle level administrator vested with
minimal discretion in a program of "fundamental" importance
may well meet the Norwick test.123 At the beginning of the 1980s,
it is discouraging to see parochial state laws retain so much influ-
ence in this area and constitutional doctrine remain so unsettled
and so unpredictable.
Equal Protection, State Power, and the Nonresident Alien
The fourteenth amendment requires that a state not "deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."'1 24 The "plain meaning" of the limiting phrase "within its
jurisdiction" has been relied on in at least two recent lower court
cases to deny the application of the equal protection clause to
aliens who reside outside the United States. In one, an action was
brought to enjoin enforcement of state laws providing that no
nonresident alien could inherit land more than three miles
outside a city or town. Only one member of the three-judge court
reached the equal protection issue, holding tilat "a state is not
constitutionally required to accord the equal protection of its laws
to [nonresident] aliens." 25 In a similar case involving the inheri-
tance of land by a nonresident alien, two members of a Fifth Cir-
121. Id.
122. Cf id. at 88 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (lawyer in Griffth was civic role
model also).
123. It has been suggested that alienage differs from other suspect categories
and should be subject to a different standard of judicial review. Nowak, Realign.
ing the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited,
Neutra4 and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEo. W. 1071, 1098-99 (1974). See also
Note, Wandering Between Two Worlds: Employment Discrimination Against
Aliens, 16 VA. I IN'L L. 355, 397 (1976). Foley and Norwick may thus represent a
transition to a downgrading of alienage to an intermediary standard of review.
124. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
125. Shames v. Nebraska, 323 F. Supp. 1321, 1333 (D. Neb.), affd, 408 U.S. 901
(1971). The concurring judge thought that the issue of equal protection was not
before the court; the third dissented.
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cuit panel stated that "[flit is ... obvious that the Fourteenth
Amendment, by its own terms, has no application to aliens not
within the jurisdiction of the United States."126
The Supreme Court has never decided a case applying equal
protection to a nonresident alien individual. Nor, indeed, has it
ever unequivocally stated that fourteenth amendment due proc-
ess applies to such aliens,12 7 but the due process clause lacks the
limiting language appended to the equal protection clause. On
the other hand, the Court decided in Blake v. McClung that for-
eign corporations may be deemed outside state jurisdiction and
not entitled to equal protection.128 Professors Currie and
Schreter argued in a 1960 article 2 9 that Blake has been overruled
sub silentio. Be that as it may, the Court recently cited and dis-
tinguished this aspect of Blake without disapproval. 30 Other
Supreme Court dicta point both towards' 3 ' and away from 1 32 a
territorial limitation on equal protection, with one Justice specifi-
cally noting that application of equal protection to nonresident in-
dividuals, as opposed to corporations, has never been reviewed.133
The commentators have split between a literal reading of the
clause and one that would in essence require its territorial appli-
cation to any subject matter within a- state's legislative jurisdic-
tion. The literalist commentators, like the literalist judges, do not
126. De Tenorio v. McGowan, 510 F.2d 92, 101 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
877 (1975). See also Cermeno-Cerna v. Farrell, 291 F. Supp. 521, 528 (C.D. Cal.
1968); In re Estate of Horman, 5 Cal. 3d 62, 74, 485 P.2d 785, 793, 95 Cal. Rptr. 433,
441-42 (1971), cert. denied sub nom. Gumen v. California, 404 U.S. 1015 (1972).
127. See Shames v. Nebraska, 323 F. Supp. 1321, 1333 (D. Neb.), affid, 408 U.S.
901 (1971). But clearly there is no territorial limitation to the due process clause,
see, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 411 (1930), and there is little to sug-
gest that nonresident aliens cannot benefit from it. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522
F.2d 612, 619 n.10 (8th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 424 U.S. 950 (1976). But of. Reyes v.
Secretary of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 476 F.2d 910, 915 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(doubting fifth amendment due process applies to nonresident aliens); Berlin
Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1976) (nonresident alien
could not charge federal government with extraterritorial violations of the Consti-
tution).
128. 172 U.S. 239, 260-61 (1898).
129. Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws:
Equal Protection, 28 U. Cm I. REv. 1, 10 (1960).
130. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 n.21 (1976).
131. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771 (1950); Terrace v. Thompson, 263
U.S. 197, 216 (1923); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
132. Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 (1946) (discussing the application of
equal protection to nonresident without intimating territorial limitations).
133. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 459 n.29 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
go beyond the words of the amendment.134 The constructionists
argue that literalist logic should fail "because the alien is in fact
being subjected to the jurisdiction by implementation of the pro-
hibition [against land ownership ]."135 This approach may have
some support on the Court. In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp.,136 out-of-state scrap dealers had to meet more onerous re-
quirements than in-state dealers in order to participate in a Mary-
land program offering a "bounty" for the destruction of old
automobiles. Maryland argued that Blake applied to the nonresi-
dent plaintiff, but the Court held that the latter was "within [Ma-
ryland's] jurisdiction." The dealer did no active business within
Maryland but had paid a Maryland license fee, had a Maryland
registered office, and was subject to Maryland "long-arm" jurisdic-
tion.137
The court in Hughes indicated that the impact of the territorial
restrictive language may be minimal but did not indicate that it is
meaningless. If a nonresident is "within the jurisdiction" when-
ever a state has legislative jurisdiction to affect his interests, then
the phrase is being read to have no restrictive meaning at all. The
due process clause already restricts the reach of state legislative
authority, and it would have been pointless to exclude application
of the equal protection clause only in instances when the due
process clause would already prevent the operation of state
law.138
134. E.g., Avins, The Equal 'Protection' of the Laws: The Original Understand-
ing, 12 N.Y.L.F. 385, 425 (1966).
135. Morrison, supra note 21, at 642; accord, Boyd, The Invalidity of State Stat-
utes Governing the Share of Nonresident Aliens in Decedents' Estates, 51 GEO. L.J.
470, 484-85 (1963); Note, Property Rights ofAliens Under Iowa and Federal Law, 47
IOWA L. REV. 105, 115 (1961).
136. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
137. Id. at 810 n.21.
138. Cf. Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 260-61 (1898) ("wvithin the jurisdiction"
qualifies "equal protection" but not "due process"). Examination of the four-
teenth amendment's legislative history supports the view that no importance
should be attached to the absence of jurisdictional language in connection with
the due process clause and the presence of "within the jurisdiction" in the equal
protection clause. In its antecedents, article I of the amendment was a grant of
legislative power, stating that: "Congress shall have power to make all laws neces-
sary and proper to secure to all citizens of the United States, in every State, the
same political rights and privileges; and to all persons in every State equal protec-
tion in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property." B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF
THE JoINT COMMrTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39H CONGRESS, 1865-67, at
51 (1914) (emphasis added). In the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, the pro-
posal received various modifications, but with emphasis in each case that rights
were secured "in each state" or "in every state." Id. at 52, 54-56, 60-61. Congress-
man John A. Bingham, principal draftsman of article I, successfully moved for the
following version:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper to secure to the citizens of each state all privileges and immu-
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There certainly are circumstances that might justify a state rule
barring nonresident aliens from particular activities. Assuming
that the rule did not contravene federal power,139 a state might
deny nonresident aliens the capacity to purchase local businesses
on the ground that they lacked loyalty to the economic concerns
of the United States and hence would tend to ignore the concerns
of the state as a unit thereof.1 4o Such reasoning would not satisfy
judicial strict scrutiny requirements, if they were applicable, but
should meet a minimum rationality test.
Even if giving the states a constitutionally freer hand with non-
nities of citizens in the several states (Art. 4, Sec. 2); and to all persons in
the several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty and prop-
erty (5th Amendment).
Id. at 61. Minus the constitutional references, the Committee presented this ver-
sion to Congress in February 1866. I STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
193 (B. Schwartz ed. 1970). When it was apparent that the February draft would
not receive a two-thirds majority in Congress, the matter was returned to the Joint
Committee, where the language of the present article I, also drafted by Congress-
man Bingham, was adopted. B. KENDRiCK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JoInT COMMTTEE
OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39TH CONGRESS, 1865-67, at 87, 91, 106 (1914).
Besides the "equal protection" language, all the language in article I already ex-
isted in the Constitution in article 4, § 2, and the fifth amendment. CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2539 (1866) (Rep. Farnsworth). Yet Congressman Bingham,
in his February draft, evidently intended by his "equal protection" language noth-
ing more than an application of the fifth amendment's principles to the states. The
language of article I, with separate due process and equal protection clauses, can
thus be viewed as an elaboration on the earlier version; therefore, the lack of juris-
dictional language in the one should have no more importance than its presence in
the other.
But would this not mean that both clauses should be territorially limited? Con-
gressman Bingham proposed the various versions of article I to alleviate his grave
doubts about the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. H. FLACK, THE
ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 76 (1908); J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 113 (1956). Of course, it was later held that those
fears were groundless; Congress had the power to enact the 1866 legislation under
the thirteenth amendment. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968).
For our purposes, though, Bingham's goal is important. The 1866 Act in its first
section, Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, granted to all citizens broad
rights "in every State ... in the United States," including the right "to inherit...
real and personal property" and "to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceed-
ings." This language lacks territorial limitations. If Congressman Bingham was
right and the fourteenth amendment was needed to vindicate the 1866 Act, then
arguably the Act would remain unconstitutional. If article I did not authorize Con-
gress to enact civil rights legislation without geographic limitations, the 1866 Act
could still be attacked because it prevented states from discriminating against
nonresident U.S. citizens.
139. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376-80 (1971) (federal statute);
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (federal power over foreign affairs).
140. Liebman & Levine, Foreign Investors and Equal Protection, 27 MERCER L.
REV. 615, 623 (1976).
resident aliens is a desirable objective, it is nonetheless undesir-
able to utilize a territorial limitation on the equal protection
clause as the means by which to achieve it. Equal protection
transcends nationality matters; a territorial limitation on the con-
cept would permit state discrimination against nonresidents on
the basis of race, religion, sex, legitimacy, and so on. A better ap-
proach would be to limit the analytical effect of alienage as a sus-
pect class to resident aliens alone.14'
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin took this approach recently in
Lehndorff Geneva, Inc. v. Warren.142 The plaintiff attacked on
equal protection grounds a Wisconsin law14 3 limiting nonresident
alien land ownership. The "plain meaning" view of the scope of
equal protection was inapplicable. Although plaintiff was a corpo-
ration owned by nonresident aliens and was a general partner in
a limited partnership with nonresident aliens, plaintiff was incor-
porated in Texas and qualified to do business in Wisconsin. The
court noted that decisions protecting resident aliens recognized
that although these aliens bore the burdens of living in American
society, they were denied the benefits and a political outlet to
seek redress. Nonresident aliens carried none of the burdens
shared by citizens and resident aliens and did not suffer the ineq-
uities felt by resident aliens. This distinction served to take non-
resident aliens out of the class for which demanding judicial
141. The constitutional definition of a "resident alien" may be rather broad, as
the Supreme Court has read fifth and fourteenth amendment protection to include
even persons whose presence "in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transi-
tory." Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976). See also Sailer v. Tonkin, 356 F.
Supp. 72 (D.V.L 1973). However, the issue has not been resolved. For example,
CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 68076-68077 (West 1978) deny resident tuition privileges at
state supported colleges and universities to aliens who have not been permanent
residents in the United States for at least one year. The constitutionality of the
provision was upheld in Wong v. Board of Trustees, 125 Cal. Rptr. 841 (Ct. App.
1975) (hearing denied and nonpublication of official report ordered by Cal. Sup.
Ct., Jan. 15, 1976). Likewise, the University of Maryland denied resident tuition
rights to the children of aliens present under nonresident visas. The case was ar-
gued as involving a denial of due process by the creation of an irrebuttable pre-
sumption of nondomicile for such aliens. As such, the matter was certifled by the
United States Supreme Court to Maryland's highest court on questions of state
law. Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647 (1978). After the state court's reply and clarifl-
cation of university policy, the issue became one of balancing numerous factors,
including immigration status rather than a pure presumption of nondomicile. The
Supreme Court remanded for consideration of new constitutional issues raised by
these changes. Toll v. Moreno, 441 U.S. 458 (1979). See generally Comment, An
Alien's Constitutional Right to Loan, Scholarship, and Tuition Benefits at State
Supported Colleges and Universities, 14 CAL. W. L REV. 514, 599-61 (1979) (com-
menting on Wong).
142. 74 Wis. 2d 369, 246 N.W.2d 815 (1976).
143. Wis. STATS. § 710.02 (1979).
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scrutiny was required.144 The long tradition of alien land laws,
the nonracial cast of the Wisconsin statute, and the rationale of
protecting the state from absentee ownership justified the less ex-
acting equal protection standard.
The problem faced by the Wisconsin court may become more
common because of the Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer v.
Heitner,145 requiring quasi-in-rem jurisdiction to meet the Inter-
national Shoe46 "minimum contacts" test. Prior to Shaffer,
American plaintiffs could invoke quasi-in-rem jurisdiction to ob-
tain an American forum against nonresident aliens with Ameri-
can investments. The Shaffer court left open the question
"whether the presence of a defendant's property in a state is a
sufficient basis for jurisdiction when no other forum is available
to the plaintiff."' 47 If the question were decided in the negative,
then state courts might try to follow Justice Stevens' Shaffer con-
currence 148 and charge foreign investors with the burden of de-
fending claims unrelated to their investments should they decide
to bring capital into the United States. Justice Stevens did not
specify whether "foreign investors" includes all nonresident in-
vestors, regardless of citizenship, or only non-Americans. As his
analysis emphasized the atypicality of foreign investment as a
good reason to impose a weightier burden upon the investor, the
chances are that he would not extend his distinguishing rule to
expatriate Americans. If so, a rule directed at "foreign investors"
would squarely raise the question of equal protection for nonresi-
dent aliens subjected to pre-Shaffer, quasi-in-rem jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court has held alienage a suspect classification
because "[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a 'discrete
and insular' minority... for whom such heightened judicial solic-
itude is appropriate."' 49 Traditional indicia of suspectness are
present if "the class is ... saddled with such disabilities, or sub-
jected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or rele-
gated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political proc-
144. 74 Wis. 2d 369, 379-83, 246 N.W.2d 815, 820 (1976). See Morrison, supra note
21, at 642-43.
145. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
146. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
147. 433 U.S. at 211 n.37.
148. Id. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring). See, e.g., Louring v. Kuwait Boulder
Shipping Co., 455 F. Supp. 630 (D. Conn. 1977).
149. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
ess." 150 The most significant disability suffered by aliens is the
serious stigma affixed to them on the basis of an involuntary class
characteristic. Presumably, that stigma attaches whether or not
the affected individuals are within or without the jurisdiction. It
goes without saying that unequal treatment of aliens, whether
resident or not, has a long history. Yet for the nonresident alien,
the detrimental effect of the classification is demonstrably less
than it is for the resident. Unlike the resident alien, the alien
physically absent from the state does not have to live with the
daily consequences of the stigma. He is outside the community,
and even if he temporarily resides within the state, the impact is
temporally less. Heightened judicial scrutiny has also been ad-
vanced as a means of protecting the politically powerless: per-
sons who cannot participate in the political process but who
ought to have its benefits because the imposition of powerless-
ness is illegitimate. Nonresidence, however, is a constitutionally
recognized basis for the denial of political participation51 and ap-
plies no less to aliens than to others. The nonresident alien's in-
ability to participate flows not from his alienage but from his
nonresidency.152
The problem here is one of classification and is analogously
similar to that in Foley v. Connelie.153 If all aliens are a suspect
class, then strict scrutiny must be employed to determine
whether the state can justify distinguishing between nonresident
aliens and all other persons. If, however, the suspect class is lim-
ited to resident aliens, then distinctions made between nonresi-
dent aliens and citizens and resident aliens is judged by a relaxed
standard. As was argued above, the stigmatic impact upon non-
residents may be minimal. If, on the other hand, the function of
establishing suspect classes is broad-to prevent a violation of a
national sense of decency rendered by classifications on the basis
of involuntary status' 54 -then the focus is on a moral conception
of government and not the specific impact on the particular class.
Furthermore, the stigma placed on nonresident aliens may well
carry over to resident aliens. For similar reasons the Court would
150. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973);
accord, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
151. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965).
152. The California Supreme Court made a similar argument in In re Estate of
Horman, 5 Cal. 3d 62, 75-76, 485 P.2d 785, 794-95, 95 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442-43 (1971), cert.
denied sub nom. Gumen v. California, 404 U.S. 1015 (1972). That court, however,
evaded the suspect classification by focusing on the distinction between residency
and nonresidency. If alienage is a generally suspect class, then splitting the class
along residential lines must be subjected to the strict scrutiny test.
153. 435 U.S. 291 (1978). See text accompanying notes 83-94 supra.
154. Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility
and the Judicial Role, 42 U. Cm. L. REv. 653, 668, 672 (1975).
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doubtless look askance at racial discrimination aimed solely at
nonresidents. However, like residence, alienage deals with ties
between individuals and geographical units, quite unlike race, re-
ligion, and other suspect classifications. Nonresidency and
noncitizenship reinforce each other.
Many intangibles are involved in striking a balance. On the one
hand, there is the risk that state laws directed towards nonresi-
dent aliens reflect a broader prejudice against aliens generally.
There is the risk of a carry-over stigma to resident aliens. Finally,
there may be some concern about leaving states free to operate in
an area that has an impact upon American foreign affairs. On the
other hand, one can start with the proposition that states are free
to act unless clearly prohibited by national law. A limited reading
of the purpose for establishing suspect classes may justify cleav-
ing alienage along residency lines. And alienage, unlike race or
religion, contains at least a few functions of real substance. Cou-
pled with nonresidency, the classification may be a subject that
one might leave to political rather than judicial processes.
Resident Aliens and the National Government
As alienage is a "suspect" category in terms of fourteenth
amendment equal protection, alienage should fall within a similar
rubric in connection with the "equal protection" limitations inher-
ent in fifth amendment due process.15 5 Concerns about discrimi-
natory federal legislation,15 6 however, have collided with the
federal government's plenary powers 5 7 over immigration and na-
tionality. The judiciary has been wary of disturbing federal legis-
lative prerogatives in a field so closely connected with
international dealings and has employed self-restraint in separat-
ing legitimate from constitutionally impermissible rulemaking.
155. In Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 601-02 (1976), the Court
applied to Puerto Rican legislation strict scrutiny tests developed for suspect
classes under the fourteenth amendment. The Court specifically avoided deciding
whether it was applying the fifth or fourteenth amendment to Puerto Rico, holding
that there would be a violation of either.
156. Such discrimination can be found, inter alia, in the following legislation: 7
U.S.C. §§ 1922, 1941, 1961 (1976) (agricultural loans); 16 U.S.C. § 742c(b) (7) (1976)
(fishing loans); id. § 831a(e) (T.V-. directorships); 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1976) (mineral
land leases); 38 U.S.C. § 4105(1) (1976) (appointment to V.A. Dept. of Medicine &
Surgery); 42 U.S.C. § 221 (officers on U.S. flag vessels); 48 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1508 (1976)
(land ownership in territories and District of Columbia).
157. E.g., note 4 supra; Hertz, Limits to the Naturalization Power, 64 GEo. L.J.
1007, 1007 & nA (1976).
The Supreme Court's traditional reluctance to disturb immigra-
tion legislation is reflected in two nonimmigration cases, thus un-
derscoring its decision to give a lesser role to equal protection for
aliens as against federal rules. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong' 58
questioned a Civil Service Commission rule excluding all aliens
from federal civil service employment. The Court struck down
the rule, not on grounds congruent with its treatment of state em-
ployment rules, but because the Commission's function was too
limited for due process to validate its blanket exclusion. Dicta in
earlier cases implied that any classification invalid under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment would also
be inconsistent with the due process requirement of the fifth
amendment. 59 In Mow Sun Wong, the Court for the first time in-
dicated that the congruence between the two provisions might not
exist if a "special national interest" were involved,160 distinguish-
ing cases in which notions of equal protection were applied when
Congress had legislated for limited purposes. By implication, fifth
amendment "equal protection" for aliens might be less for federal
than for state employment, although the Court did not need to
reach that question.'61 "When the Federal Government asserts
an overriding national interest as justification for a discriminatory
rule which would violate the Equal Protection Clause if adopted
by a State, due process requires that there be a legitimate basis
for presuming that the rule was actually intended to serve that in-
terest."162 Although the Government could assert a number of
possible grounds to justify the exclusionary rule, only one was
within the mandate of the Commission. 63 The latter's sole con-
cern was to promote an efficient federal service, and administra-
tive convenience was an inadequate justification for the blanket
prohibition against hiring aliens. 6 4
The practical impact of the decision seems negligible. Within a
few months of the Court's decision, President Ford issued an ex-
ecutive order barring aliens from civil service in most in-
158. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
159. Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975); Johnson v. Robison,
415 U.S. 361, 364 n.4 (1974).
160. 426 U.S. at 100.
161. Id. at 103.
162. Id.
163. Possible grounds are: facilitating the President's negotiation of foreign
treaties by enabling him to offer American employment opportunities to foreign
citizens in return for reciprocal concessions, encouraging naturalization, and
avoiding the expenses of classifying positions when undivided loyalty is essential.
Id. at 104. The latter was the only purpose falling within the Commission's man-
date. Id. at 115.
164. Id. at 115.
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stances.165 Lower courts have upheld the efficacy of this order
from constitutional attack.166
The hollowness of the victory in Mow Sun Wong was confirmed
in its companion case, Mathews v. Diaz.167 Aliens challenged a
federal statute denying them Medicare benefits unless they were
admitted to the United States for permanent residence and had
resided here continuously for at least five years.168 The Court up-
held the statute against a due process attack. It found that Con-
gress had no duty to provide all aliens with the benefits granted
to citizens. Therefore, the only issue was whether Congress was
permitted to make the statutory discrimination within the class of
aliens. Even assuming that the exclusion was broader than nec-
essary to protect the fiscal integrity of the program, Congress
could limit participation in the program based on the degree of af-
finity to the United States. Petitioners had suggested no "princi-
pled basis for prescribing a different standard than the one
selected by Congress."169
The reasonableness of the decision depends on the link be-
tween "affinity" to the United States and Medicare benefits. Al-
though the Diaz Court did not explain "why the alien's degree of
affinity is relevant to his right to participate in the insurance pro-
gram,"'170 the Court in Mow Sun Wong had listed a number of
plausible reasons for the rule: as a "bargaining chip" for negotiat-
ing similar rights for Americans working abroad and as a means
by which to encourage aliens to qualify for citizenship by residing
continuously in the United States for five years. 17 1
If one utilizes a "rational basis" test or some other form of re-
laxed scrutiny, these reasons can pass constitutional muster.172
165. 41 Fed. Reg. 37,303 (1976).
166. Vergara v. Hampton, 581 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 905
(1979); Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 435 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Cal. 1977), on remand
from 426 U.S. 88 (1976); Santin Ramos v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 430 F.
Supp. 422 (D.P.R. 1977), on remand from 426 U.S. 916 (1976).
167. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 1395o(2) (1976).
169. 426 U.S. at 84.
170. Protection, supra note 30, at 285.
171. See note 163 supra.
172. See.Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 435 F. Supp. 37, 45 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (presi-
dential order barring aliens from civil service upheld as encouraging naturaliza-
tion of eligible aliens and, for those not eligible, preventing disruption by
discharges for failure to obtain citizenship when eligible); Santin Ramos v. United
States Civil Serv. Conm'n, 430 F. Supp. 422, 425 (D.P.R. 1977) (regulation barring
alien disaster loan applications encourages naturalization and strengthens bor-
If, however, one demands more compelling reasons for the rule, it
would be difficult to justify the discrimination. The problem oc-
curs in trying to justify a more relaxed approach 73 when dealing
with the federal power.
Professor Gerald Rosberg has recently written in detail on this
problem, and it would be redundant to retrace the ground he has
covered. Rosberg asserts that the Court should exercise less cau-
tion in scrutinizing federal legislation divorced from immigration
matters, and he argues that it is worthwhile to draw a line be-
tween immigration and nonimmigration matters and deal with the
latter under a "strict scrutiny" test analogous to the one used for
state alien legislation. 74 The Court has chosen not to do so and
has chosen to avoid the difficulties of linedrawing in an area in
which it feels that political decisionmaking must be freed from ju-
dicial backbenching.
Justices Brennan and Marshall, at least, did not think that all
federal legislation dealing with aliens is now free from judicial
tampering: although they voted with the Court in Diaz, they ex-
pressly held open the equal protection issue in Mow Sun
Wong. 7 5 For them, a bar to federal employment for all aliens is a
different question from that of a limited exclusion of aliens from
Medicare benefits.
Would a new Mow Sun Wong turn out differently from Diaz?
Applying a relaxed standard of scrutiny, the federal district court
on remand easily upheld the presidential order reiterating the
alien exclusion from federal jobs,176 as did the Seventh Circuit in
Vergara v. Hampton.17 7 Yet the result could be reversed consist-
ently with Diaz.
In Mow Sun Wong, the Court distinguished between fifth
rower ties to government). See also Vergara v. Hampton, 581 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 905 (1979) (civil service); United States v. Gordon-Nik-
kar 518 F.2d 972, 976-77 (5th Cir. 1975) (federal jury service).
173. The Court has since described Diaz as employing a "relaxed" standard.
Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7 n.8 (1977). Lower courts have also employed that
standard of review. Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 435 F. Supp. 37, 45 (N.D. Cal.
1977) (presidential order barring aliens from civil service is a rational means of en-
couraging naturalization for those eligible; for those not yet eligible, contrary rule
would disrupt civil service as aliens who had met residency requirement would
have to be fired if not naturalized); Santin Ramos v. United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 430 F. Supp. 422, 425 (D.P.R. 1977) (citizenship requirement for disaster
loans encouraged aliens to take out citizenship and strengthened ties between
borrower and government). One court has stated that strict scrutiny will never be
applied to federal alienage laws. Lopez v. Bergland, 448 F. Supp. 1279, 1282 (N.D.
Cal. 1978).
174. Protection, supra note 30, at 337.
175. 426 U.S. at 117.
176. Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 435 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
177. 581 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 441 U.S. 905 (1979).
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amendment "equal protection" when dealing with locally oriented
congressional legislation and federal legislation having nation-
wide impact,1 8 indicating that the fifth amendment's impact
closely resembles that of the fourteenth's equal protection clause
only in the local situation. Yet laws with national impact can also
run afoul of fifth amendment "equal protection" when they deal
with matters akin to "fundamental rights," such as citizenship. 7 9
Clearly, the mere fact that aliens are the subject of legislation
does not insulate the federal government from judicial scrutiny
any more than does the designation of legislation as involving
"foreign affairs."180 But the difficulty in distinguishing between
the '"pure" immigration cases and the ones not intended to have a
direct impact on immigration policys'' might persuade the Court
to follow a more relaxed rule of scrutiny for legislation distin-
guishing among aliens but a stricter scrutiny when a federal rule
divides all aliens from all citizens. This, combined with classifica-
tion on the basis of the types of rights involved,182 could well jus-
tify a different result between Diaz and an appeal against the
Presidential order barring all aliens from federal employment.
A second approach would focus on the fact that Mow Sun Wong
involved a flat ban on all alien participation in federal employ-
ment, whereas Diaz denied benefits only to aliens who had either
resided for less than five years in the United States or were non-
immigrants. Even for purposes not directly linked to immigration,
Congress should be freely permitted to distinguish between non-
178. 426 U.S. at 103. See also Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 601
(1976) (Puerto Rican discrimination against aliens falls within similar analysis in
both fifth and fourteenth amendments).
179. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964).
180. Cf. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (treaty must be consistent with fifth
and sixth amendments).
181. Compare Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977), with Protection, supra note 30,
at 325.
182. Professor Rosberg, Protection, supra note 30, at 288, suggests but rejects
the notion that "suspect classification" analysis exists under the fifth amendment
only for rights of "life, liberty, and property." Establishing differing tests based
solely on that classification could be roughhewn. Nevertheless, the Court will cer-
tainly intervene to protect the fundamental rights of allens, despite the impor-
tance of federal legislative supremacy over immigration, although it would not for
lesser rights. Congress could not, for example, punish aliens without trial merely
to give the President a bargaining chip. See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163
U.S. 228 (1896). Federal employment is neither a right so critical as the right to
trial nor a matter clearly falling within the "life, liberty, and property" triumvirate.
At the same time, exclusion from employment in a significant economic sector is
arguably of far greater magnitude than a limited barrier to social security benefits.
immigrant aliens, who enter the United States for temporary pur-
poses, and immigrant aliens, who have permanent resident status.
Congressional legislation drafted along that axis concentrates on
the temporary nature of the nonimmigrant's stay, not on his alien-
age. Strict scrutiny might be reserved for legislation that distin-
guishes among permanent residents or between citizens and
permanent resident aliens, but not between permanent residents
and temporarily resident aliens.
Although Congress has established the statutory classes of im-
migrants and nonimmigrants for the purposes of the immigration
laws,183 Congress classifies aliens according to permanency for
other purposes as well. For example, Congress usually requires
that an immigrant have five years' residence in the United States
to be eligible for naturalization.184 The statute attacked in Diaz
was consistent with the congressional view, as exemplified by the
naturalization standard, that immigrant status plus five years' res-
idence is sufficient permanence to be eligible for many of the fed-
eral benefits accorded citizens. This suggests that for the
purposes of applying strict scrutiny, the dividing line between
"permanent" and "nonpermanent" alien residents might be
drawn from norms established by Congress. Once those norms
are established, the Court would apply strict scrutiny to federal
legislation discriminating between citizens and "permanent" alien
residents (or among the latter) and a relaxed standard of scrutiny
for other legislation affecting aliens.
Under the fourteenth amendment, strict scrutiny applies, at a
minimum, to state laws directed at aliens even temporarily or ille-
gally present in the United States. 85 But the federal government
has virtually untrammelled power to classify aliens between
those with permanent and temporary status and to decide which
shall become citizens and which shall not. Strict scrutiny should
apply to congressional legislation treating those aliens most like
citizens in a manner different from the way citizens are treated.
The government could show that a regulation affecting such
aliens was genuinely concerned with immigration matters or for-
eign affairs, but it would be the government's burden to do so.
Aliens temporarily here would not get the benefit of strict scru-
tiny. Although division between the classes would be left to Con-
gress, if Congress presented no coherent line by which to
distinguish between the classes, the Court could draw an arbi-
183. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (15), (32), (33) (1976).
184. Id. § 1427(a). See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7 n.8 (1977) (emphasizing
this point with respect to Diaz residency requirement).
185. See note 141 supra.
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trary line or apply strict scrutiny to all federal alien laws or to
none of them. The problem is unlikely to arise.
A third but related approach would focus on the apparent con-
tradiction between admitting an alien for a stated purpose and
then denying him substantial means for the accomplishment of
that purpose. For example, an alien admitted to permanent resi-
dence must almost of necessity derive employment income from
within the United States in order to remain here. Congress has
recognized this by permitting immigrants to be employed once
they have been admitted. Not so nonimmigrants, who are admit-
ted for temporary purposes which, in many cases, are inconsis-
tent with employment or, if employment is involved, it relates to
specific employment limited as to type and duration.186 By admit-
ting an alien to permanent residence and then denying him the
right to employment in government, a substantial employment
sector, Congress has established a contradiction. The contradic-
tion can be explained as either being rationally based on a need
for barring aliens generally from government jobs or on discrimi-
nation based purely on nationality. Given the apparent contradic-
tion between the bar to employment and the status that requires
that employment opportunity be maintained, the reasons for cre-
ating the contradiction should be closely scrutinized.187 Not so
the social security benefits in Diaz, as residence is not normally
dependent on government assistance, whereas employment is
generally a necessity.
This approach would require classification of particular kinds of
matters-employment, housing, and so on-as essential to fulfill
the purposes of the granted admission. Notice, for instance, that
federal denial of admission to broad sectors of housing might be
viewed as a contradiction of alien admission on all but the most
temporary nonimmigrant basis. Given Diaz, even if the Court ac-
cepted this approach, one would expect to see its application em-
phasizing latitude to Congress and a narrow definition of matters
essential to aliens. But both this approach and the preceding one
would at least provide the means to deal with significant types of
186. C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1.34
(1978). See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h) (11) (1979) (temporary worker must petition to
change employer).
187. Cf. Castaneda-Gonzalez v. INS, 564 F.2d 417, 433 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(despite Diaz, regulation refusing to permit permanent resident to change jobs
would present serious constitutional question).
federal alien discrimination without opening the door to intensive
judicial scrutiny of immigration policy generally.
Nationality is not a terribly convincing classification instrument
for determining when social and economic benefits should be ac-
corded. For that reason alone, the Court might well require a leg-
islative or executive finding of a connection between the denial of
a benefit to aliens and the gaining of an advantage for the United
States in foreign affairs or immigration matters.188 Such a re-
quirement might elicit more political honesty from deci-
sionmakers; the decision in Mow Sun Wong does not appear to
have extracted any.189 Beyond that, and uncompelling though na-
tionality may be as a classification, its proximity to the problem of
constitutional control over immigration and foreign affairs dic-
tates judicial prudence and a large measure of freedom to Con-
gress and the President.
Nonresident Aliens and the National Government: Constitutional
Rights and Standing
The nationality distinction applied in Berlin Democratic Club v.
Rumsfeld9O is far more difficult to criticize. Recent cases estab-
lish that the United States Constitution governs acts abroad by
American federal' 9 ' and state' 92 officials affecting citizens 93 and
aliens.194 In United States v. Toscanino,195 the Second Circuit ap-
plied this principle to reject judicial jurisdiction over a nonresi-
188. Protection, supra note 30, at 337.
189. See text accompanying notes 165 and 166 supra.
190. 410 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1976).
191. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957); Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634 (D.C.
Cir. 1966). In many cases the problem is determining whether the acts complained
of are those of American officials, as the independent acts of foreign officials can-
not be invoked. E.g., Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 743-45 (9th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969); Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775, 782 (5th
Cir.), cert denied, 382 U.S. 963 (1965). There is a question, however, whether evi-
dence might not be so tainted by foreign officials' methods in obtaining it as to
make it inadmissible in the United States. United States v. Nagelberg, 434 F.2d
585, 587 n.1 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 939 (1971). Cf. Cooley v. Wein-
berger, 518 F.2d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 1975) (use of Iranian murder conviction to
deny social security benefits would not violate due process unless procedure used
to obtain convictions would shock the conscience of U.S. community).
192. State v. LeMay, 27 Or. App. 447, 556 P.2d 688 (1976).
193. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1967); Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
194. United States v. Cotroni, 527 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1975) (semble), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 906 (1975); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
195. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). The court felt that the strict application of the
Ker-Frisbie rule had weakened and jurisdiction should be rejected when Ameri-
can officials had employedk"shocking" methods to bring the defendant into the ju-
risdiction. See generally Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119
U.S. 436 (1886).
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dent alien illegally seized by federal officials abroad.19 6 Yet in
Berlin, the court agreed to adjudicate an action by American citi-
zens based dpon the illegal wiretapping of United States officers
abroad but dismissed a nonresident alien's action alleging the
same facts. The plaintiffs requested injunctive, declaratory, and
monetary relief for significant violations of constitutional rights
by the officials and sought to sustain jurisdiction, inter alia, under
the broad terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a).197 The court did not pass
on the substance of the alien's claim but ruled that he lacked
standing198 to bring it.199
Although the alien plaintiff was suing to protect an interest of
his own200 and the Berlin court gave no specific reasons why judi-
cial relief would be improper, the court relied on cases which sug-
gest that nonresident aliens lack standing to challenge
governmental action. In part, the court was influenced by doubts
that the constitutional guarantees involved in the complaint ex-
tend to nonresident aliens. 201 Although standing is not deter-
mined by the ultimate outcome,202 the difficulty of the decision
and the context in which it was raised perhaps justified the
court's dismissal of the action.
Precedent for the general proposition that nonresident aliens
lack standing is traceable to Johnson v. Eisentrager,2O3 holding
196. Thd Second Circuit has tempered Toscanino but appears to adhere to a
modified view of Ker-Frisbie. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1971). Other jurisdictions adhere strictly to Ker-Frisbie. E.g.,
United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1974). See generally Note, The
Short-Lived Death of the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine, 9 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 131 (1976).
197. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions...
[arising] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331(a) (1976).
198. The issue of standing is "whether the litigant is entitled to have the court
decide the merits of the dispute of particular issues. This inquiry involves both
constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations
on its exercise." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
199. Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 152-153 (D.D.C.
1976).
200. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973); Barlow v. Collins, 397
U.S. 159, 164 (1970).
201. 410 F. Supp. at 152 (citing, e.g., Reyes v. Secretary of Health, Educ. and
Welfare, 476 F.2d 910, 915 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1973)) (doubting that due process applies
to nonresident alien).
202. Cf. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86
HARv. L. REV. 645, 651-52 (1973) (plaintiff must have merely a sufficient interest to
justify standing).
203. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
that a nonresident enemy alien convicted and incarcerated by the
military outside the United States could not obtain habeas
corpus. Although the case contains dicta about nonresident
aliens generally, that language must be read in the context of a
case centered on the petitioner's enemy alien status and the peti-
tion's plea for habeas corpus, which then required the prisoner to
be before the court.204 Nevertheless, the Berlin court, following
certain authorities, 205 read Eisentrager for the broad proposition
that a nonresident alien lacks standing to challenge government
action, unless his claim involves a "res" held by the government
within the United States or a specific statutory scheme inter-
preted to accord standing to nonresident aliens.20 6
The precedents do not establish this broad proposition. As a
general matter, nonresident aliens are permitted to sue in Ameri-
can courts in the absence of disabling legislation.207 In early
Supreme Court cases in which nonresident aliens challenged gov-
ernmental acts on fifth amendment grounds, the disputes in-
volved property within the United States. 20 8 However, the cases
themselves never insisted that property within the United States
was a crucial factor; that "res" explanation appears to originate in
a lower court decision written by Judge (later Chief Justice) Bur-
ger. 20 9 In fact, Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States,210 the
leading "res" case, broadly stated that "[tjhe petitioner was an
alien friend, and as such was entitled to the protection of the
Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 2 1 1 rejecting the
Court of Claims' ruling that it lacked jurisdiction because the pe-
204. Constructores Civiles de Centroamerica, S. v. Hannah, 459 F.2d 1183, 1190
(D.C. Cir. 1972); Estrada v. Ahrens, 296 F.2d 690, 694 (5th Cir. 1961). See also
Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 597 n.5 (1953). The "presence of the pris-
oner" doctrine has been eroded significantly. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit
Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973) (presence of jailer within jurisdiction sufficient).
205. Kukatush Mining Corp. v. S.E.C., 309 F.2d 647, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Pauling
v. McElroy, 278 F.2d 252, 254 n.3 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1960);
Braude v. Wirtz, 350 F.2d 702, 706 (9th Cir. 1965); L HENKn, FOREIGN AFFAmS AND
THE CoNSTrrurboN 267 (1972).
206. 410 F. Supp. at 152.
207. Sliosberg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 244 N.Y. 482, 492, 155 N.E. 749, 752-53
(1927); accord, In re Rugh's Estate, 211 Iowa 722, 728, 234 N.W. 278, 280 (1931) (ap-
plication to be administrator); Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, 127 Wis. 650, 651,
106 N.W. 821, 822 (1906), aff'd, 208 U.S. 570 (1908). See also Georgia v. Brailsford, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794) (British subjects could sue to recover on debts); see gener-
ally Berger v. Stevens, 197 N.C. 234, 235-37, 148 S.E. 244, 245 (1929) (discussing his-
torical background).
208. E.g., Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931); Disconto
Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, 208 U.S. 570 (1908). See Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank,
361 F.2d 106, 111 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 898 (1966).
209. Kukatush Mining Corp. v. S.E.C., 309 F.2d 647, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
210. 282 U.S. 481 (1931). See also Guessefeldt v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 308, 318
(1952) (giving broad reading to Russian Volunteer Fleet).
211. 282 U.S. at 489.
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titioner's country of nationality was unrecognized by the Ameri-
can government. At least one case relied upon by the Court in
Russian Volunteer Fleet is virtually impossible to squeeze into
the "ies" mold, although it also involved the property rights of a
nonresident alien corporation.2 12
The precedents dealing with nonresident aliens fall into three
general categories:
(1) Immigration cases: Even under the broad language of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),213 nonresident
aliens lack standing to challenge governmental refusal to
certify them for visas2 14 although resident aliens may do
so.2 15 This result rests on an interpretation of the immi-
gration laws finding congressional intent to vest nonre-
viewable discretion in administrative authorities.
"[Immigration cases have] always stood on a special foot-
ing."216
(2) The "Res" cases: 217 These have already been discussed.
(3) Statutory schemes: Distinguishing two of its earlier
212. Id. (citing Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 411 (1930)). Dick held that
fourteenth amendment due process forbade application of Texas public policy in
disregard of a time limitation in an insurance policy 'written by a Mexican corpora-
tion on Mexican property in favor of a Texas resident in Mexico. There was noth-
ing within Texas justifying the application of Texas law. See generally Hertz, The
Constitution and the Conflicts of Laws: Approaches in Canadian and American
Law, 27 U. ToRoirro L.J. 1, 14 (1977). Dick cannot be viewed as a "res" case.
213. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(2), 702 (1976).
214. Cobb v. Murrell, 386 F.2d 947 (5th Cir. 1967); Braude v. Wirtz, 350 F.2d 702
(9th Cir. 1965).
215. Reddy, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 492 F.2d 538 (5th Cir. 1974).
The Ninth Circuit has evaded the result of its Braude decision, see note 205 supra,
by conferring on the employer standing to sue. Yong v. Regional Manpower
Adm'r, 509 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1975); accord, Pesikoff v. Secretary of Labor, 501 F.2d
757, 760 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1038 (1974); Secretary of Labor v. Farino,
490 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1973). But see Intercontinental Placement Serv., Inc. v.
Shultz, 461 F.2d 222 (3d Cir. 1972) (no standing for employment agency locating po-
sitions for aliens). Compare Chinese Am. Civic Council v. Attorney General, 396
F. Supp. 1250 (D.D.C. 1975) (nonresident alien never in U.S. lacked standing to
challenge denial of entry), affd on other grounds, 566 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
with Jaimez-Revolla v. Bell, 598 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (alien who voluntarily de-
parted to pursue readmission request did not lack standing to challenge denial of
reentry).
216. Kukatush Mining Corp. v. S.E.C., 309 F.2d 647, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (per
Burger, J.).
217. Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931); Disconto Ge-
sellschaft v. Umbreit, 208 U.S. 570 (1908); Constructores Civiles de Centroamerica,
SA. v. Hannah, 459 F.2d 1183, 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Kukatush Mining Corp. v.
S.E.C., 309 F.2d 647, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
cases,2 1 8 the court in the Concica case 2 19 allowed standing
under the APA for a nonresident alien corporation to chal-
lenge a decision by the Agency for International Develop-
ment (AID) refusing the plaintiff's low bid to construct a
road in Nicaragua. The court, in interpreting the broad
language of the Act,220 saw no reason to construct an ex-
ception barring nonresident aliens from challenging an ar-
bitrary AID decision and found for the plaintiff. Although
Concica substantially erodes the nonresident alien excep-
tion to standing in APA cases, there is no reason to be-
lieve, as the Berlin court seems to say, that Concica is
inapplicable to all constitutional challenges by nonresi-
dent aliens.
As the alien plaintiff in Berlin had a "personal stake"221 in the
outcome, denial of standing presumably rested on a "concern
about the ... properly limited ... role of the courts." 222 Profes-
sor Scott has discussed the calculated confusion that courts cre-
ate by blending standing with other doctrines justifying their
refusal to decide cases. 223 Scott maintains that although plain-
tiffs' access to the courts has been liberalized, it would be wrong
to abandon the notion of voluntary judicial abstention from poli-
cymaking as to particular issues. 224 He calls this second type of
standing "decision standing,"225 which may require a greater de-
gree of plaintiff injury or interest in the outcome to convince the
court that a difficult matter should be judicially determined.226
"[W] here Congress has authorized judicial review of a particu-
lar set of government actions. or decisions, there is less difficulty
218. Kukatush Mining Corp. v. S.E.C., 309 F.2d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1962), was distin-
guished as involving "an alleged evildoer" who was acting only for his own benefit.
Pauling v. McElroy, 278 F.2d 252, 254 n.3 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835
(1960), involved "nonresident aliens who [did] not [allege] specific threatened in-
jury." Constructores Civiles de Centroamerica, SA. v. Hannah, 459 F.2d 1183, 1191
& n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
219. Constructores Civiles de Centroamerica, S.A. v. Hannah, 459 F.2d 1183
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
220. 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) (1976).
221. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164 (1970). Under earlier developed doc-
trine, still relied upon today, plaintiff has standing if there would be a common law
remedy for the same acts committed by a private party. Scott, supra note 202, at
650. Under either German or American law, the wiretapping complained of should
constitute an invasion of privacy. Krause, The Right to Privacy in Germany-
Pointers for American Legislation?, [1965] DuKcs W. 481, 500.
222. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
223. Scott, supra note 202, at 684. See generally Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159,
176 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Scott, supra note 202, at 683-90.
224. Scott, supra note 202, at 690.
225. Id. at 685 n.153.
226. Id. at 684-85.
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[for the courts] as to ... [their] policymaking role."227 Berlin
may, therefore, be correct in limiting the liberalization of Concica
and other APA cases when considering certain constitutional
claims by nonresident aliens. In challenges to administrative ac-
tions, the court must construe the statute underlying the adminis-
trative decision to see whether judicial review is available. This
still permits judicial selectivity when facing statutory matters in
which challenges by nonresident aliens would be inappropriate.
In a constitutional case such as Berlin, such selectivity is less eas-
ily divisible .by subject matter.
Particularly relevant to cases involving the application of con-
stitutional rights to nonresident aliens is the caution with which
the Supreme Court approached the issue of overseas application
of constitutional guarantees with respect to citizens. In rejecting
the blanket argument that such application would encumber the
American government in foreign affairs,228 the Court found that
obligations imposed by the government because of citizenship re-
quired a concomitant limitation of government action within con-
stitutional guarantees. 2 29 Moreover, Americans abroad cannot
rely upon foreign governments for protection but aliens at home
can expect protection in their own land.23 0 Finally, although the
freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution may outweigh foreign
policy interests in cases involving citizens, the issue is far more
doubtful in cases involving persons lacking any substantial con-
nection with the United States.
Berlin's invocation of a preclusionary doctrine on a nationality
basis is justifiable. To the extent that injunctive or declaratory re-
lief was proper, the citizen plaintiffs' case would carry relief for
the alien plaintiff. As for the alien's monetary claim, in the con-
text of the larger injuries suffered by the citizens and the impor-
tance of the decision on applicability of rights to nonresident
aliens, the injury may have been viewed as too inconsequential
for judicial action.23 1
Whatever limitations are placed on the "decision standing" of
227. Id. at 686.
228. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957). See Reply Brief for United States,
Reid v. Covert, 1 L Ed. 2d 2137-38 (1957).
229. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957).
230. See Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 152-53 (D.D.C.
1976). Accord, Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 600 n.31 (1976).
231. See Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 153 (D.D.C.
1976); Scott, supra note 202, at 684-85.
nonresident aliens, these limitations should not be determined on
a "res" theory. Although the expropriation in Russian Volunteer
Fleet took place within the United States, should the place of ex-
propriation be relevant? If it took place on the high seas and the
ships were moored in a friendly haven outside the United States,
that should not preclude the plaintiff from standing. Similarly, if
the defendant in Toscanino were incarcerated outside the United
States, that should not preclude American courts from hearing a
claim for habeas corpus. 23 2 Rather, the question of "decision
standing" must rest on the gravity of the claim. For instance, in-
carceration or expropriation might be viewed as more conse-
quential than the wiretapping in Berlin. Given the undoubted
collision between governmental foreign policy interests and con-
stitutional freedoms, the courts might well avoid decisions on the
less compelling claims and wait for congressional directives.
Beyond the standing issue remains the question of the substan-
tive applicability of constitutional protections to aliens abroad.
Reid v. Covert233 can be read broadly for the proposition that con-
stitutional guarantees operate outside American territory in favor
of American citizens. Reid did not decide whether the rights of
Americans overseas are as extensive as those at home.234 The
Berlin court resolved that issue in favor of parity, and other
courts have created no distinction based on locale.2 35 Nonresi-
dent aliens, on the other hand, clearly have procedural due proc-
ess rights in American courts236 as well as the right to just
compensation for the taking of their American property.23 7
The Court of Claims has held that just compensation is also due
for takings by American officials of foreign property owned by
nonresident aliens,23 and fourth amendment rights have been ac-
corded to a nonresident alien, at least when the government
sought to exploit the fruits of a foreign search in an American
232. The 'Jailer" would be the federal agency holding him abroad. Braden v.
30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
233. 354 U.S. 1, 6 (Black, J., for four justices), 56 (Frankfurter, J., concurring), 74
(Harlan, J., concurring).
234. Compare Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957) (Black, J.), with id. at 74
(Harlan, J., concurring) (same guarantees not necessarily applicable).
235. 410 F. Supp. at 155, 157 n.6. Accord, Williams v. Blount, 314 F. Supp. 1356,
1363-64 (D.D.C. 1970) (first amendment).
236. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 416 n.7 (9th Cir.
1977) (due process "minimum contacts" test applies to foreign defendants);
United Continental Tuna Corp. v. United States, 550 F.2d 569, 574 (9th Cir. 1977)
(denial to alien of right to sue U.S. government met due process rationality re-
quirements).
237. Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931).
238. Camacho v. United States, 494 F.2d 1363, 1368 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Turney v.
United States, 115 F. Suppo 457 (Ct. CL 1953), cited with approval in Reid v. Cov-
ert, 354 U.S. 1, 8 n.10 (1957) (Black, J., for four justices).
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trial.239 Yet doubt surely remains as to whether all constitutional
rights semantically applicable to noncitizens would be accorded
to nonresident aliens even if accorded to citizens abroad.
The problem goes a step further. although resident aliens may
have a general group of rights offered them within American bor-
ders, what happens when they are abroad? If the concept of citi-
zenship plays a minimal role in dealing with rights at home,240
should resident aliens nevertheless be treated differently abroad?
In matters which are basically domestic but about which the gov-
ernment fortuitously acts abroad, surely no distinction should be
made. But as soon as a matter touches upon foreign affairs, it
may well follow that locale and citizenship are relevant factors in
determining limitations on government action and that govern-
ment may need more latitude in dealing with noncitizens abroad,
whether or not they have a connection with the United States.
Such issues, however, remain to be raised.
Individual Discrimination Against Aliens
The issue of individual discrimination against aliens on the ba-
sis of nationality arose in an action24 1 brought under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, prohibiting discrimination in the area of em-
ployment on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex or national ori-
gin."242 Although federal regulations subsumed discrimination on
the basis of "nationality" within the term "national origin,"243 the
Supreme Court rejected this ruling in an almost purely semantic
discussion.244
The matter has not rested there, for the issue of discrimination
by individuals has been pursued under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.245 In
239. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 280 (2d Cir. 1974); accord, Note, 88
HARV. L. REV. 813, 824-25 (1975); 17 VA. J. IlT'L L 131, 133 n.10 (1976). But see
United States v. Orman, 417 F. Supp. 1126, 1131 (D. Colo. 1976) (citing Toscanino
dissent with approval).
240. Bickel, Citizenship in the American Constitution, 15 ARz. L. REV. 369, 387
(1973).
241. Espinoza v. Farah Mfr. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
242. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1) (1976).
243. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1(d) (Supp. 1972), amended post-Espinoza by 39 Fed. Reg.
10,123-24 (1974).
244. 414 U.S. 86 (1973). The House of Lords reached the same conclusion in in-
terpreting the same words in an English civil rights statute. Ealing London Bor-
ough Council v. Race Relations Bd., [1972] A.C. 342 (H.L.).
245. All persons within the jurisdictiopi of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to
Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 246 the Fifth Circuit held
that section 1981 applied to discrimination by nongovernmental
units against aliens on the basis of nationality. The court rea-
soned that section 1981 had its origin in section 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, as did section 1982. The Supreme Court has on
a number of occasions suggested that section 1981 "extend[s] to
aliens as well as to citizens." 247 And, the Fifth Circuit ruled, it
had already held that Section 1981 applied to private discrimina-
tion in employment.248 Consequently, the law would reach pri-
vate discrimination in employment against aliens.
Both courts249 and commentators 250 have attacked this decision
on the bases of constitutional law and statutory interpretation.
There is general agreement that section 1981 applies to aliens.
There is disagreement as to whether it applies to nonracial pri-
vate discrimination. Clearly, the thirteenth amendment supports
legislation against racial discrimination, private or otherwise, but
not laws that do not constitute "badges of slavery."251 The four-
teenth amendment is broader but has always been interpreted to
require state action. Thus discrimination purely on the basis of
citizenship probably cannot be attacked constitutionally on the
basis of the thirteenth amendment and legislation dealing with
purely private action could not meet the state action requirement
of the fourteenth amendment. However, the Guerra court also re-
lied on the "necessary and proper" clause in addition to federal
power over immigration and nationality. Although Congress in its
1870 reenactment of the 1866 legislation focused on the fourteenth
amendment, the immigration power can be fairly asserted as a
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens,....
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
2§6. 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974). See also N.L.R.B. v. International Longshore-
men's Ass'n, Local 1581, 489 F.2d 635 (5th Cir.) (alienage discrimination for job re-
ferrals with union "unfair labor practice"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974).
247. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948).
248. Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641, 654-55 (5th Cir. 1974).
Accord, Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975).
249. DeMalherbe v. International Union of Elevator Contractors, 438 F. Supp.
1121, 1141-42 (NM). Cal. 1977).
250. Brousseau, Alienage and the Constitution. The Requirement of State Action
Under Section 1981, 30 ARK. L. Rav. 1, 12-18 (1976); Note, 6 CAL W. Iirr'L L.J. 172,
185 (1975). Contra, Note, Wandering Between Two Worlds: Employment Discrimi-
nation Against Aliens, 16 VA. J. INt'L L 355, 397 (1976).
251. That the "badge of slavery" need not be racial is shown by cases striking
down the criminalization of labor contract violations, Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S.
4 (1944), and upholding the federal Anti-Peonage Act, Clyatt v. United States, 197
U.S. 207 (1905).
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constitutional foundation for the legislation.25 2
Of greater concern to the critics is the finding of congressional
intent to benefit aliens suffering private discrimination. Section
1981 plainly states that "[a]l persons within the jurisdiction of
the United States shall have the same right ... to make and en-
force contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens. '25 3 This sec-
tion, derived from section 16 of the 1870 Act, is substantially
identical to section 1 of the 1866 Act except for these particulars:
it accords rights to "all persons," while the 1866 Act applied to
"citizens," and it does not deal with the right to hold and convey
real and personal property.25 4 In fact, much of the essential lan-
guage in sections 16 and 17 of the 1870 Act tracks that of sections 1
and 2 of the 1866 Act.
There is scattered language in the debates over the 1870 Act re-
ferring to "state laws" and to section 16 as designed to enforce the
fourteenth amendment.2 5 5 On the other hand, Senator Stewart,
who introduced sections 16, 17, and 18 into the final version of the
Act,25 6 qualified section 16 as a "requirement that all citizens shall
252. See Usery v. Charleston County School Dist., 558 F.2d 1169, 1171 (4th Cir.
1977) (legislative history need not refer to fourteenth amendment in order to sus-
tain statute under it); Usery v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148, 155 (3d
Cir. 1976) (same), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977); Note, Applying the Equal Pay
Act to State and Local Governments: The Effect of National League of Cities v.
Usery, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 665, 679-80 (1977) (failure to articulate constitutionally ad-
equate basis does not jeopardize its use). Compare National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 & n.17 (1976) (Fair Labor Standards Act unconstitutional as
applied to state and local governments under commerce clause; expressing no
opinion as to whether a different result might occur if Congress sought to achieve
same end by exercising other powers), with Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453
n.9 (1976) (distinguishing National League of Cities; Congress intended to exer-
cise powers under fourteenth amendment, § 5; legislation constitutional as applied
to state governments).
In Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951), the Court construed 1871 civil rights
legislation narrowly to avoid a constitutional question on congressional power. In
Griffm v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), the Court reinterpreted the same legis-
lation broadly and upheld it, inter alia, under the "right to interstate travel," a
doctrine the roots of which were barely extant in 1871. See Crandall v. Nevada, 73
U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867). See also Nimmer, A Proposal for Judicial Validation of a
Previously Unconstitutional Law: The Civil Rights Act of 1875, 65 CoLum. L. REV.
1394 (1965) (1875 Act constitutional under commerce clause, although The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), treated Act as being passed under thirteenth and
fourteenth amendments).
253. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
254. CONG. GLoBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1536 (1870) (Sen. Stewart) (commenting
on S.B. 365, which later became §§ 16 and 17 of the 1870 Act).
255. E.g., id.; id. at 3701 (Sen. Casserly).
256. Id. at 3561-62.
obey the fourteenth amendment and shall not violate the provi-
sions of that amendment while it is in force."257 Section 17 was
more clearly directed against government-related discrimination.
Discussing section 1 of Senate Bill 365, from which section 16 was
derived, Senator Stewart said, "[I]t extends the operation of the
[18661 civil rights bill... to all persons within the jurisdiction of
the United States,"2 5 8 with the exception of certain property and
inheritance rights.
Although the Senate appeared to qualify section 16 as a meas-
ure to enforce the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court has
held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as derived from section 16, "affords a
federal remedy against discrimination in private employment on
the basis of race."25 9 The cases so deciding were brought by citi-
zens, but the statute and the cases themselves do not limit the
remedy to citizens. Although the Supreme Court's finding of a
remedy against private discrimination might appear to conflict
with the Senate's description of section 16 as a fourteenth amend-
ment measure, the "meager legislative history"260 certainly
should not be read as any limitation on the broad language of the
statute. It is equally clear that aliens have a right of action under
section 16 for denial of equal protection of the law under color of
state law.261 In sum, section 16 is a remedy for public and private
denials of rights on the grounds of race and for public denial of
rights because of alienage. Having gone that far, where in the
broad language of section 16 is there language to deny a remedy
for private discrimination on the grounds of alienage? "Section
1981 was enacted to protect the rights of two groups of people-
non-whites and non-citizens who were not afforded equal treat-
ment to white citizens .... The standard against which the
rights of protected individuals must be matched remains the
rights of white citizens. '262 Senator Stewart was clearly con-
cerned with discrimination against the Chinese, which entwined
,257. Id. at 3658 (emphasis added).
258. Id. at 1536.
259. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975). See also
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 173 (1976).
260. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 327 & n.10 (1941). Although Classic
was referring to § 17 of the 1870 Act, its remark applies equally well to § 16. So
little were §§ 16 and 17 discussed that two opponents of the provisions argued that
the Senate had not even understood that they were included in the final version of
the Bill. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3701-02 (1870). A motion for clarifica-
tion was withdrawn only after the Vice-President read from the record, id. at 3703,
to demonstrate that §§ 16 and 17 had, indeed, been properly submitted as part of
the final version.
261. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377 (1971).
262. League of Academic Women v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 343 F. Supp. 636,
638-39 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (dictum). Accord, Rackin v. University of Pa., 386 F. Supp.
992, 1009 (ED. Pa. 1974) (dictum).
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concepts of race and citizenship.263 Surely he would be surprised
to learn that the rights of Chinese were limited to questions of
race, not alienage.264
In criticizing Guerra, one commentator remarked that "reason
ought [to] tell us that a Congress which itself in federal employ-
ment engages in massive alienage discrimination never for a mo-
ment considered prohibiting the merchant and the farmer in his
choice of citizen-employees." 265 Whether or not that was true in
1870,266 it is not clear that Congress would not deny to individual
employers what it did itself. National security, encouragement of
naturalization, and other acceptable federal policies can outweigh
the desirability of equal employment opportunities for aliens.
Moreover, section 16 covers many private contractual and other
relationships for which there is no equivalent public analogy or, if
there is, no actual citizenship discrimination. Congressional deci-
sions to bar aliens from federal jobs should not be read as a con-
gressional attitude towards any activity involving aliens and
certainly not as a willingness to tolerate private discrimination on
a citizenship basis.
TAXATION
A major assumption of both international and municipal law is
that the state of nationality "has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of
law attaching legal consequences to conduct of national[s], wher-
ever that conduct occurs." 267 Thus, the United States may punish
a citizen's commission of conspiracy to defraud a government
263. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (discrimination against
Chinese based on hostility to race and nationality).
264. See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3658 (1870).
265. Brousse~u, Alienage and the Constitution: The Requirement of State Action
Under Section 1981, 30 ARi. L. REv. 1, 18 (1976). The writer also comments on the
risk of an alien's suing the Secretary of a federal department for barring him from
federal employment. That risk, of course, is obviated now that § 1981 has been
held inapplicable to federal employment discrimination on citizenship grounds.
Vergara v. Hampton, 581 F.2d 1281, 1285 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 905
(1979).
266. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 107 (1976) (spoils system
prior to 1883 probably reserved government jobs to citizens because they were vot-
ers). In 1870, however, a number of states still permitted aliens to vote. Voting,
supra note 20, at 1099. One cannot, therefore, assume that in 1870 the federal gov-
ernment generally excluded aliens from employment.
267. RESTATEMtENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 30 (1965) (emphasis added).
agency, 68 treason,2 69 murder,270 or trademark infringement,27 ' as
long as the regulating rule is adopted according to constitutionally
delegated powers. Federal courts may be empowered to sub-
poena witnesses, and the citizen must respond under his duty to
the nation "to support the administration of justice by attending
its courts and giving his testimony whenever he is properly sum-
moned."272 Citizenship.provides a nexus sufficient to require the
attendance of a citizen, but it is insufficient to require the pres-
ence of a nonresident alien who has done nothing to subject him-
self to United States process.
These views have been extended to the tax area.2 73 The
Supreme Court has held that American citizens may be made lia-
ble for taxes on a global basis. 2 74
[The power of] the Government of the United States so far as its admitted
taxing power is concerned... is coextensive with the limits of the United
States... and... embraces all the attributes which appertain to sover-
eignty in the fullest sense. [The taxpayer argued that cases involving
state taxation decided "that the power to tax was limited by the capacity
of the taxing government to afford that benefit and protection which is the
true basis of the right to tax.. ." and that where that capacity did not ex-
ist, the tax was arbitrary and unconstitutional.] But here again the confu-
sion of thought consists in mistaking the scope and extent of the
sovereign power of the United States as a nation and its relation to its citi-
zens and their relations to it .... [G]overnment. . . by its very nature,
benefit[s] the citizen and his property wherever found .... [TJhe argu-
ment ... belittles and destroys . . . [the] advantages and blessings [of
citizenship] by denying the . . . government ... an essential power re-
quired to make citizenship completely beneficial. 2 75
The Court noted that the Constitution does not have "the effect of
destroying obvious powers of government" but rather preserves
and distributes them.276 Taken together with the statement that
federal taxing power "embraces all the attributes which appertain
to sovereignty in the fullest sense,"2 77 one could argue that, like
the English parliament, the federal government could tax without
268. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
269. Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952) (by dual national); Gillars v.
United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
270. United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933) (murder by U.S. citizen aboard
U.S. vessel in foreign waters).
271. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 282 (1952).
272. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932).
273. Compare United States v. Bennett, 232 U.S. 299 (1914) (constitutional to
tax foreign property belonging to U.S. citizen), with Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378,
406 (1933) (national power to tax determined by applying international law princi-
ples). See Wurzel, Foreign Investment and Extraterritorial Taxation, 38 CoLtMr.
L REv. 809, 831-32 (1938) (U.S. tax on transaction wholly without U.S. connection
would violate fifth amendment as being "without compensation" whatever).
274. Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924); United States v. Bennett, 232 U.S. 299
(1914).
275. United States v. Bennett, 232 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1914).
276. Id. at 306.
277. Id. Accord, Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378, 404-05 (1933).
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regard to citizenship, despite the international repercussions. On
the other hand, it has generally been supposed that citizenship,2 78
residence,27 9 a source of income within the United States,2 80 or
other minimum contact 281 is a sine qua non for a tax to avoid vio-
lating fifth amendment due process.
Reliance on citizenship as the sole basis for tax jurisdiction
raises difficulties when citizenship is unclear. The Rexach282
cases illustrate the complexities that occur when citizenship is
lost and then regained during a period of legal uncertainty. Felix
Benitez Rexach ("Felix") was born in Puerto Rico and became an
American citizen under the Puerto Rico Organic Act of 1917. Felix
and his wife, Lucienne d'Hotelle de Benitez Rexach ("Lucienne"),
a French citizen, were married in 1927. She became a naturalized
American in 1942. The couple went to the Dominican Republic in
1949, where Felix engaged in harbor construction projects for the
Trujillo regime.
In July 1958, Felix executed a written renunciation of his Ameri-
can citizenship. The State Department approved a certificate of
loss of nationality, and Felix became a citizen of the Dominican
Republic. After Trujillo's assassination in 1961, Felix applied for
an American passport, claiming that his 1958 renunciation was
compelled by economic pressure and physical threats and was
thus involuntary. The State Department Board of Review on Loss
of Nationality accepted his testimony, cancelled the certificate of
loss of nationality, and issued the passport.
Lucienne reestablished her residence in France in 1946, residing
there until 1952 when the State Department determined that she
had lost her citizenship as of 1949 because she had lived in her
278. E.g., Levitt, Income Tax Predicated on Citizenship: Cook v. Tait, 11 VA. L.
REV. 607 (1925); .Trautman, The Role of Conflicts Thinking in Defining the Interna-
tional Reach of American Regulatory Legislation, 22 Omo ST. L.J. 586, 604 (1961).
279. See Treas. Reg. § 1.871-1(a), TMD. 7332, 39 Fed. Reg. 44,218 (1974).
280. I.R.C. §§ 864, 871.
281. The exact line between constitutionally permissible and impermissible
taxation of nonresident aliens is unclear. Wurzel, Foreign Investment and Extra-
territorial Taxation, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 831 (1938).
282. United States v. Lucienne d'Hotelle, 558 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1977), revg United
States v. Rexach, 411 F. Supp. 1288 (D.P.R. 1976); Benitez Rexach v. United States,
390 F.2d 631 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 833 (1968). In the text, Lucienne
d'Hotelle is referred to as "Lucienne's case." Benitez Rexach v. United States, 390
F.2d 631 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 833 (1968), is referred to as "Felix's case."
The extensive litigation reported in other Rexach cases, footnoted in Lucienne
d'Hotelle, 558 F.2d at 38 n.1, need not concern us here.
native France for more than three years.283 Lucienne travelled on
American passports until May 20, 1952, when the State Depart-
ment made its determination. She never attempted to regain her
American citizenship nor did she officially renounce it. In Octo-
ber 1952, the Dominican Republic extended her citizenship retro-
actively to January 2, 1952. This citizenship was revoked by the
provisional government succeeding the Trujillo regime. She ob-
tained a French passport in June 1962 and used it until her death
in 1968.
From 1944 onwards, Felix earned millions of dollars in the Do-
minican Republic. The American government sued for back taxes
pertaining to those earnings. As the source of the earnings was
the Dominican Republic and Lucienne had a vested one-half in-
terest in the earnings under that country's community property
laws, each of the spouses could be sued for only half of Felix's
earnings.284
Felix was clearly a citizen until 1958, but the Government also
assessed him on his global earnings for the period between 1958
and 1962 when his citizenship renunciation was in effect, on the
ground that he continued to be a de jure citizen during that pe-
riod. Felix conceded that, on the record, he was a citizen at all
times as his renunciation was null and void ab initio but he ar-
gued that he was not a de facto citizen because "the United States
was freed of its obligations to him as a citizen [during that pe-
riod] and he in fact lived and existed as an alien to the United
States during the period in question."285 As the United States
owed him no obligations, he owed the United States no taxes.
Although Cook v. Tait286 indicated that the right to tax nation-
als was based on reciprocal obligations between the state and the
citizen,287 the Rexach court denied that the obligations had to be
mutual in the manner Felix contended: "It is sufficient that the
government's [obligations] stem from its de jure relationship
without regard to the subjective quid pro quo in any particular
case."288 The court rejected estoppel arguments, presumably be-
cause there was no impropriety by the State Department in ac-
cepting the 1958 renunciation of citizenship. Difficulties with this
de jure relationship theory will be explored in conjunction with
Lucienne's case, which turned out somewhat differently.
283. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 404(b), 54 Stat. 1170.
284. United States v. Rexach, 185 F. Supp. 465, 478 (D.P.R. 1960).
285. Benitez Rexach v. United States, 390 F.2d 631, 632 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 833 (1968).
286. 265 U.S. 47 (1924).
287. Id. at 56.
288. Benitez Rexach v. United States, 390 F.2d at 632.
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In response to Supreme Court decisions invalidating various
sections of the expatriation laws, the Internal Revenue Service
ruled that reinstatement to citizenship would, in certain cases, be
given prospective effect only. After Schneider v. Rusk289 invali-
dated the law under which Lucienne lost her American citizen-
ship, the IRS decided that naturalized persons who had lost their
citizenship by residing in their native land for three years or more
would nevertheless not be taxed as citizens prior to 1971, unless
the person '"prior to ... 1971, but after the time of specific con-
duct which was mistakenly deemed to have resulted in loss of cit-
izenship, affirmatively exercised a specific right of citizenship."2 90
Under the exception, liability for taxes would begin with the tax
year in which the specific citizenship right was exercised. A simi-
lar ruling, likewise prospective, was made for women who lost
their citizenship by marriage to aliens under the Expatriation Act
of 1907.291 Neither ruling applied to Felix, who lost his citizenship
under voluntary relinquishment principles. 2 92
Analysis of Lucienne's tax liability can be divided into three
parts: 1944 through 1949, the date at which the State Department
deemed her citizenship lost; 1949 through May 1952 when her
American passport was taken away; and the period subsequent to
May 1952. Lucienne's estate did not appeal the district court's
finding against it for the first period. The lower court found in her
estate's favor for the other periods, and the Government appealed
the judgment relating to the second period only.2 93
The Government's position before the First Circuit was that
section 404 of the Nationality Act of 1940, under which Lucienne
had lost her citizenship, had been retroactively voided by Schnei-
der v. Rusk294 and Afroyim v. Rusk,295 thereby restoring
Lucienne's nationality as of 1949 and rendering her liable for tax.
In 1952, of course, section 404 would almost certainly have been
upheld. 96 The issue became one of retroactive application of the
constitutional invalidation and its tax consequences.
289. 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
290. Rev. Rul. 70-506, 1970-2 C.3. 2.
291. Rev. Rul. 75-357, 1975-2 C.B. 5.
292. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (7) (1976).
293. United States v. Lucienne d'Hotelle, 558 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1977).
294. 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
295. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
296. See, e.g., Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
In Rocha v. INS,297 the First Circuit had applied Afroyim v.
Rusk retroactively in order to declare the petitioner's mother a
citizen and consequently to find that the petitioner had obtained
citizenship by descent.298 Rocha raised no issues that required a
determination of the time at which citizenship vested; that is, at
petitioner's birth or only at the date of judgment. Lucienne's
case, though, required a decision as to whether her citizenship
would be deemed restored for the 1949-52 period and thus subject
her to tax.
The court found that, although citizenship generally required
the payment of taxes, it would be inequitable to use Schneider
and Afroyim "to compel payment of taxes by all persons who mis-
takenly thought themselves to have been validly expatriated." 299
In Lucienne's case, the court followed the IRS' ruling3 OO and held
Lucienne's estate liable for back income taxes because she had
affirmatively exercised citizenship rights during the 1949-52 pe-
riod.301
The situation was otherwise for the post-1952 period. First,
Lucienne could be treated as having renounced her citizenship
herself after 1952. Even if she had not, when the government
treated her as an alien de facto as well as de jure, it would have
297. 450 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1971), withdrawing prior opinion 351 F.2d 523 (1st Cir.
1965).
298. Angela Rocha's mother lost her American citizenship under the Expatria-
tion Act of 1907, ch. 2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228, because she married an alien and thus
acquired his nationality. MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915), sustained the
constitutionality of this statute which was later repealed by the Cable Act, ch. 411,
§ 7, 42 Stat. 1022 (1922). Until 1934 only male Americans could pass their citizen-
ship on to their children born outside the United States. See Weedin v. Chin Bow,
274 U.S. 657 (1927). In 1934 American women acquired the right as well. Presuma-
bly, Congress was aware in 1934 that children born to alien fathers and American
mothers married between 1907 and 1922 would still not derive American citizen-
ship through their mothers if the mothers had lost their citizenship through mar-
riage. When the Rocha court found the 1907 Act unconstitutional, it assumed that
Angela must automatically obtain the benefits of the 1934 Act because the Consti-
tution made her mother a citizen once again. However, only Congress could make
Angela a citizen, and Congress had never decided that she should be one. One
can argue that, as Congress could never have anticipated a case like Rocha, the
1934 Act was never intended to cover the question of Angela's citizenship and, for
lack of any law affirmatively granting her citizenship by descent, she should not
have obtained it. Although such a reading of the 1934 Act plainly discriminates be-
tween children whose mothers married aliens between 1907 and 1922 and those
whose mothers did not, that distinction is arguably permissible under Rogers v.
Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971). In any event, the interpretation of the 1934 Act is a sub-
stantial issue which ought to have been discussed at some point.
299. United States v. Lucienne d'Hotelle, 558 F.2d 37, 42 (1st Cir. 1977).
300. Rev. RuL 75-357, 1975-2 C.B. 5; Rev. Rul. 70-506, 1970-2 C.B. 1.
301. The quid pro quo existed: "Fairness dictates that the United States recover
income taxes for the [1949-52] period.... Lucienne was privileged to travel on a
United States passport; she received the protection of its government." 558 F.2d at
43.
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been estopped to reverse itself. "Lucienne cannot be dunned for
taxes to support the United States government during the years
in which she was denied its protection."3 02
If the government was estopped in Lucienne's case, why was it
not in Felix's?3 03 Lucienne's citizenship was restored through
constitutional decision, but Felix's was restored through in-
tepretation; Felix requested restoration and Lucienne did not; and
Felix specifically renounced his citizenship in the first instance.
But why are these factors critical? The "duress" 304 in a case such
as Felix's might well rise to a level such that, under Afroyim v.
Rusk,305 Congress could not as a constitutional matter disregard
such duress in defining a "voluntary relinquishment" of citizen-
ship. The position taken by government officials in Lucienne's
case was no less bona fide than in Felix's,30 6 and both were only
302. Id.
303. The interrelationship between the two cases on this point was not raised
in Lucienne's case, even in the briefs, as the government did not appeal her post-
1952 tax liability, and the court discussed the matter on its own motion.
304. The Dominican government pressured Felix to see if his citizenship had
been lost because of his position as commercial advisor to the Dominican Em-
bassy in Paris in 1952 or 1953. Record Appendix to Brief for Appellant at 10, Beni-
tez Rexach v. United States, 390 F.2d 631 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 833 (1968).
That government wanted to show that Felix was no longer a U.S. citizen in order
to quash the IRS investigation of Felix's affairs and to "prevent [the] worsening of
external international relations growing out of practices of that Government"
which the investigation was uncovering. Id. at 9. when it appeared that Felix's
employment with the Dominican government did not jeopardize his American citi-
zenship, that government pressed for his renunciation. Felix alleged that "his for-
mal renunciation of United States citizenship was an act compelled by not only
fear of financial loss or ruin, but also that he was, in fact, in fear of his personal
safety if he refused to obey the.., commands of the Dominican Government to
divest himself of his American status." Id. at 11-12. The record tends to substanti-
ate the degree to which Trujillo was willing to go to punish persons who disobeyed
him as well as actual measures which were taken against Rexach and his busi-
ness. One should not assume that the duress experienced by Rexach was merely
the minimum entitling him to call his renunciation involuntary.
305. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
306. The Government argued in Felix's case: "While it is true, as later deter-
mined, that taxpayer's action was involuntary, it is also true that only he and not
the State Department knew such to be the case." Brief for Appellee at 15, Benitez
Rexach v. United States, 390 F.2d 631 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 833 (1968).
Ordinarily, consent under duress remains valid consent to persons unaware of the
duress. Cf. Roper v. Harper, 4 Bing. (N.C.) 20, 132 Eng. Rep. 696 (C.P. 1837) (de-
fendant not liable for conversion as unaware that plaintiffs consent to taking had
been extracted under duress). If, however, Congress could not constitutionally re-
fuse to return Felix's citizenship because of duress, it is at least arguable that
given that Felix was unable to reveal that he was under duress, the State Depart-
ment's understanding is irrelevant. The argument is not one of estoppel rather, it
is that, even as the Government could not ignore the duress and fail to reinstate
de jure citizens during the periods in question.
The most likely difference between the cases is that Felix, al-
though not acting completely without duress, renounced his citi-
zenship at least in part to escape taxation. As a matter of
statutory interpretation, renunciation had not been voluntary, but
it was not unfair to subject him to the tax consequences that
flowed from the invalidation of the loss of nationality. If, however,
the duress had been such that Congress could not constitution-
ally disregard it, one would think that the court would treat Felix
no differently from the way it treated Lucienne.
Voluntary renunciation of citizenship -likewise creates tax is-
sues. In United States v. Matheson,30 7 the decedent, Mrs. Burns,
never lived in the United States after the age of fifteen. She mar-
ried a second time at the age of forty to a Mexican national.
Under Mexican law, her marriage made her a citizen by naturali-
zation. As a prerequisite to obtaining a certificate of Mexican na-
tionality, she submitted to the Mexican government a declaration
of allegiance to Mexico and renunciation "of all protection foreign
to" its laws, agreeing "not to invoke with respect to [Mexico] any
right inherent in [her] nationality of origin."30 8 Throughout the
remainder of her life, the decedent and Matheson, her lawyer and
executor, acted as though the 1944 renunciation did not constitute
an act of expatriation. She obtained American passports, af-
firming in her applications that she had never sworn allegiance to
a foreign state. The State Department found that she had dual
nationality. Despite later Mexican interpretations of her 1944
statement as a renunciation of American citizenship,3 09 the Sec-
ond Circuit held that it was merely a declaration that she would
not look to the United States for protection as a national while
she was in Mexico, a reading consistent with a dual national's ob-
Felix as a citizen, so it could not ignore the duress and treat him as a citizen dur-
ing the renunciation period.
The Government further argued that Felix said nothing about duress even when
he was present in Puerto Rico for tax litigation and thus "seemingly removed from
the impact of alleged threats of physical violence." Brief for Appellee at 17. But
Felix remained domiciled in the Dominican Republic until such time as he did re-
veal the duress that he had experienced. Moreover, he quite plausibly showed
that Trujillo's wrath could transcend international boundaries.
307. 532 F.2d 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976).
308. Id. at 816.
309. Id. at 817. In 1949 the Mexican naturalization law was modified to require
explicit renunciation of other citizenship in applying for a certificate of Mexican
nationality. Testimony was introduced to show that this change was merely a leg-
islative recognition of the existing Mexican practice and that the oath taken by
Mrs. Burns in 1944 was meant to be a renunciation. The Second Circuit did not
accept this interpretation, taking the view that it was Mrs. Burns' understanding
that was determinative and that the evidence showed clearly that she did not treat
it as a renunciation.
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ligations. The court held that the not unequivocal declaration be
read against renunciation, as in other cases "it would be unfair to
strip an individual of his American birthright when he honestly
but mistakenly believed that his conduct did not compromise his
legal status as a United States citizen or as a dual national."310 In
the alternative, the court would have held against the taxpayer
through application of the doctrines of estoppel and laches.
Prior to 1966, persons in Mrs. Burns' situation could escape
United States taxation by voluntary expatriation. For instance, in
Dillin v. C.I.R. ,311 the taxpayer in 1958 entered into an agreement
under which he would receive compensation from 1963 through
1965 for services rendered in 1958. Shortly before he was to re-
ceive the first payment, the taxpayer renounced his citizenship
and moved permanently to the Bahamas. Because he was a cash
method taxpayer, he was held to be taxable as a nonresident
alien on the amounts received after his expatriation, even though
the sole purpose of his renunciation was to avoid taxation. Con-
gress enacted legislation in 1966 providing that nonresident aliens
who, within the ten-year period immediately preceding the close
of the taxable year, lost United States citizenship must pay an al-
ternative tax, unless the loss did not have as one of its principal
purposes the avoidance of tax.3 12 The tax was imposed in a case
quite similar to Dillin, arising-shortly after the effective date of
the new law.313
This legislation may create certain difficulties with tax treaties.
One writer has drawn attention to the fact that expatriates would
be treated as noncitizens and yet subjected to tax.3 14 Federal law
specifically provides that the expatriation provision will not apply
if it is contrary to a treaty.3 1 5 Although the United States pre-
serves the right in treaties to tax its own citizens, the expatriate
would presumably fall within a new class, not covered by the sav-
ing clause, and would consequently benefit from treaty protection
if a resident within the other treaty state.3 1 6
310. Id. at 815.
311. 56 T.C. 228 (1971).
312. I.R.C. §§ 877(b) (income tax), 2107, 2501(a) (3) (estate and gift taxes).
313. Kronenberg v. CJ.R., 64 T.C. 428 (1975).
314. Ness, Federal Tax Treatment of Expatriates Entitled to Treaty Protection,
21 TAX. LAW. 393, 395-96 (1968).
315. Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-809, § 110, 80 Stat. 1575.
316. Ness, Federal Tax Treatment of Expatriates Entitled to Treaty Protection,
21 TAX. LAW. 393, 398-99 (1968).
Two arguments might be made against the constitutionality of
the tax on expatriates. First, there remains the unresolved issue
of whether, legislation aside, Americans have a right of voluntary
expatriation or are bound to perpetual allegiance. 317 The Act of
1868,318 the first legislative declaration of a right of expatriation,
purported on its face to be no more than an acknowledgement of
existing rights. It might be argued, therefore, that Congress may
not impinge on this right by imposing a tax burden, either be-
cause the right is one of the innominate rights protected by the
ninth amendment 319 or because the original understanding that
such a right existed means that Congress has always lacked the
power to undercut it.320 Secondly, even if legislative assistance is
needed to permit citizens to sever their allegiance, it might be
contended that Congress can do no more than acquiesce and re-
frain from imposing conditions subsequent to the acceptance of
the renunciation. In other words, Congress could well refuse to
permit the renunciation for the purpose of tax avoidance, but
once it decided to accept the expatriation it could not attach con-
ditions subsequent. The status of the naturalized citizen is
clearly analogous to this contention. 321 Although Congress may
317. MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 309 (1915) (leaving issue unresolved). See
generally Gordon, The Citizen and the State: Power of Congress to Expatriate
American Citizens, 53 GEo. L.J. 315, 317-22 (1965). Compare Slaymaker, The Right
of the American Citizen to Expatriate, 37 AM. L. REV. 191, 204-05 (1903) (perpetual
allegiance doctrine repudiated), with Dutcher, The Right of Expatriation, 11 Am.
L REv. 447, 474 (1877) (expatriation requires legislation). See also Afroyim v.
Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 264-66 (1967); Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491, 497-98
(1950).
318. R.S. § 1999, 15 Stat. 223 (1868) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1976)).
319. Cf. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STANt. L. REv. 703,
715-16 (1975) (ninth amendment embodies concept of "higher law").
320. These arguments are diminished by the fact that in the 1907 Act, Congress
prohibited expatriation during wartime. In re Peterson, 33 F. Supp. 615, 616 (E.D.
Wash. 1940) (Congress has power to permit or prohibit expatriation during war-
time). See also 9 Op. ATrr'Y GEN. 62 (1857); 8 Op. Arr'y GEN. 139, 157, 162, 167 (1856)
(noting that no legislation restricts voluntary expatriation). Under current law ex-
patriation during wartime may be prevented if contrary to the national interest. 8
U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (7) (1976). Of course, the power to prevent expatriation during
wartime may not be equivalent to a power to inhibit expatriation for fiscal or other
reasons.
321. See Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 166 (1964); Note, Constitutional Limita-
tions on the Naturalization Process, 80 YALE L.J. 769, 781-82 & nn. 56-57 (1972).
Schneider advances the view that citizenship by naturalization can be no different
from native-born citizenship, except for the lack of qualifications to be President,
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5, and the possibility of denaturalization, 8 U.S.C. § 1451
(1976). See also Faruki v. Rogers, 349 F. Supp. 723 (D.D.C. 1972) (naturalized citi-
zens could not be barred from Foreign Service for 10 years after naturalization).
Expatriation was an entirely separate matter and required justification lacking in
Schneider. Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 835 (1971), indicates that citizens by de-
scent may be subject to requirements that native-born citizens could not suffer.
For the moment, however, it appears that Congress may not attach conditions sub-
sequent to citizenship by naturalization within the United States.
[voL. 17: 37, 1979] Consequences of Nationality
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
attach virtually any set of conditions to the granting of citizen-
ship, it may grant no less than full citizenship once it agrees to
naturalize and may not impose conditions enforceable after-
wards. 22
Even assuming a constitutional defect in the expatriation tax,
another route could achieve the same result. The purpose of the
tax is to discourage the taxpayer's divesting himself of the link
upon which his assessability is based in order to avoid taxation
on income which, under the tax rules, would not accrue until after
the link was severed. The same problem exists with aliens, who
are taxable on their global income when domiciled in the United
States but only on their United States source income when non-
resident aliens. 323 As the United States cannot prevent aliens
from changing their status and may not tax nonresident aliens
globally, any attempt to prevent an evasion of tax through a
change in residence must focus on events taking place prior to
the change. For example, cash basis taxpayers, such as the one in
Dillin,324 who had rights to future payment could be deemed to
have accrued the right to payment and the liability for taxes and
yet be required to pay the tax in the year in which the income
was physically received. This would mean that normal cash basis
taxpayers would see no practical change in their tax obligation,
but both resident aliens and citizens who became nonresident
aliens would be liable on the equivalent of the present accrual ba-
sis. The federal government must then define, within reasonable
limits, which events constitute the receipt of income prior to a
change of residence or citizenship so as to deter tax evasion by
that change.
The Rexach cases, involving the problems of involuntary expa-
triation, posed a genuine conflict between the constitutional
power to tax and the consequences of an unconstitutional invol-
untary expatriation. Although the court of appeals in Lucienne's
322. Congress has required citizenship candidates to swear a willingness to
bear arms as a prerequisite to naturalization. Note, Constitutional Limitations on
the Naturalization Power, 80 YALE L.J. 769, 781 n.56 (1972). It has never been de-
termined whether this oath could be enforced once citizenship has been granted
or what consequences would attach for failure to live up to it.
323. Compare LR.C. § 1 (taxing all individuals globally), with id. § 871 (taxing
nonresident aliens on U.S. source income). See Langer, The Need for Reform in the
Tax Treaty Area, in INcohE TAx TREATIES 746-47 (J. Bischel ed. 1978).
324. See note 311 supra.
case founded part of its decision on estoppel,325 that estoppel
would appear to be of constitutional magnitude. If Congress un-
constitutionally deprived Lucienne of her citizenship during a
particular period, it should not be able to tax her on the basis of
the de jure citizenship discovered when the congressional enact-
ment was found invalid. In international law terms, there may be
a significant question as to whether a State can declare an indi-
vidual a noncitizen and then reverse its decision, attaching ex
post facto consequences. Even if that were not so, the reasoning
in Cook v. Tait326 poses a due process problem to global taxation
of a person declared to be a noncitizen and outside American re-
sponsibility. Felix's case is more difficult, as the government
would have had no way of knowing its mistake; it could have as-
certained its error in Lucienne's situation. But the fact remains
that the tax was imposed on the basis of citizenship existing only
in name, when the government would have rejected any responsi-
bility for the individual during the period of de jure citizenship.
SECURMES LAws
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc. 327 is one of a line of cases defin-
ing the extraterritorial reach of the federal securities laws. Ear-
lier decisions had applied those laws to foreign transactions by
nonresident aliens adversely affecting the American stock ex-
change price of shares held by nonresident American citizens 328
and misrepresentations made in the United States by aliens to
Americans to effect their participation in a foreign transaction.32 9
Bersch involved the common stock of I.O.S., Ltd., a Canadian cor-
poration operating wholly outside the United States. The plain-
tiffs sued because of activities by American and alien defendants
both abroad and in the United States that affected I.O.S. share-
holders in three categories: Americans resident in the United
States,33 0 Americans resident abroad, and nonresident aliens.
325. 558 F.2d 37, 43 (lst Cir. 1977).
326. 265 U.S. 47 (1924).
327. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
328. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 405 F.2d 215 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom., Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906
(1969).
329. See, e.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d
Cir. 1972).
330. The court stated that "losses to foreigners from sales to them within the
United States, are not before us." 519 F.2d at 993. Many of the "American purchas-
ers" bought bearer shares, id. at 992 n.42, and the citizenship of such shareholders
might be obscure. Either the court was confident that resident aliens were not
among the resident Americans, id. at 990, or it was treating such aliens as "Ameri-
can purchasers."
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While "freely acknowledg[ing]" 33 1 the lack of a statutory basis for
doing so, the Bersch court formulated a different jurisdictional
test for each shareholder. The court held that the antifraud provi-
sions of the securities laws applied to losses from sales of securi-
ties (1) to American citizens resident in the United States
regardless of whether the defendants' acts or omissions occurred
in the United States and (2) to nonresident Americans only if
"acts (or culpable failures to act) of material importance in the
United States have significantly contributed" to those losses.3 3 2
But the provisions would not apply to the losses from sales (3) to
aliens "outside the United States unless acts (or culpable failures
to act) within the United States directly caused those losses."333
In Bersch the defendants' "merely preparatory activities" in the
United States met the "material importance" test for Category II,
but did not meet the "directly caused" test for Category I.
Equal protection notions inherent in fifth amendment due proc-
ess probably do not prohibit such a distinctiona, 334 but such dis-
crimination violates the spirit of equality and may conflict with
American treaty obligations.33 5 Moreover, if one considers the
purpose of the securities laws, a nationality test is difficult to jus-
tify on any basis other than ease of application when considering
these laws.
When activities prohibited by the securities laws have a signifi-
cant impact on American securities or exchanges, those laws ap-
331. Id. at 993.
332. Id.
333. Id. (emphasis added); UT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017-18 (2d Cir.
1975); Note, Extraterritorial Application of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934-The Implications of Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc. and HT v. Vencap,
Ltd., 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 397, 412-13 (1976). For other cases applying this test
to nonresident aliens, compare F.O.F. Proprietary Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Young &
Co., 400 F. Supp. 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (only U.S. link was defendants' American na-
tionality and preparation of offering circular in U.S.; no jurisdiction to losses of
nonresident aliens), with Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 595 (3d Cir. 1976)
(where scheme conceived in U.S. by U.S. citizen involved stock in U.S. companies
traded over the counter within U.S. plus omissions by U.S. broker, sufficient con-
nection for jurisdiction although plaintiffs nonresident aliens). See also Des
Brisay v. The Goldfield Corp., 549 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1977) (Canadian company
listed on U.S. exchanges injured by fraud involving U.S. corporation stock listed
on U.S. exchange); S.E.C. v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977) (use of U.S. mails,
offices in U.S., other contacts; only victim was foreign corporation).
334. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (resident aliens could be denied social
security benefits on basis of length of residence).
335. Note, American Adjudication of Transnational Securities Fraud, 89 HARv.
L. REV. 553, 569 (1976).
ply even if the plaintiffs are all nonresident aliens.33 6 Bersch
involved neither American securities nor exchanges. Rather, the
complaint maintained that the United States was being used as a
staging ground for economic injury to residents and nonresidents
through the purchase of foreign securities. In such cases the
courts have sought to relate the significance of the activities
within American territory to the injury produced, borrowing from
and adapting international law limitations to determine the extra-
territorial scope of national regulation. The judicial goal has been
to avoid overinjecting American regulation into essentially foreign
transactions and overburdening American courts with matters
lacking substantial American concern.
The Second Circuit initiated adherence to the Restatement (Sec-
ond), Foreign Relations Law of the United States as a guideline
to jurisdictional interpretation.3 37 Restatement sections 17 and 18
justify Bersch's Category I test, as there was not only conduct
within the United States but also substantial effects upon persons
within the United States directly and foreseeably caused by all
conduct, within and without the United States. Restatement sec-
tion 17 alone also supports jurisdiction in the Category H and III
cases, 338 as conduct took place within the United States and the
United States had a sufficient interest to prohibit the use of its
territory as a staging ground for antisocial behavior. In addition,
some foreign states view the protection of nonresident nationals
against even extraterritorial conduct as a viable, if secondary, ba-
sis for regulatory jurisdiction.33 9 Although the United States has
not adopted this "passive personality" principle, this doctrine to-
gether with section 17, supports the conclusion that the United
States has a greater interest in protecting nonresident citizens
than nonresident aliens from injury caused by activities within
American territory.3 4 0
Although international law can be used as a guideline to sup-
port the Bersch Category Il test, is the distinction justifiable in
terms of the purposes of the securities laws? Those laws are
meant to protect economic interests-American, to be sure, but in
336. Des Brisay v. The Goldfield Corp., 549 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1977).
337. See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied
sub nom. Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
338. S.E.C. v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 112-13 (3d Cir. 1977).
339. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELAIONs LAW OF THE UNrrED
STATES § 30, Comment e (1965).
340. Cf. Uravic v. Jarka Co., 282 U.S. 234, 239 (1931) (American stevedore work-
ing on German ship protected by American law where German seaman might not
be); Trautman, The Role of Conflicts Thinking in Defining the International Reach
of American Regulatory Legislation, 22 OsIo ST. L J. 586, 609-10 (1961) (discussing
Uravic).
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the sense of protecting the American securities system rather
than protecting citizens as such. Those laws applied in the
Bersch situation, either because the investor has a right to expect
American protection (Category I investors fall into that class) or
because the American securities system requires that protection
(Categories II and III).
The issue is whether nationality is functionally adequate to set
limits on the protection American securities law can provide. If
one attempts to provide limits by looking to factors such as the
securities involved, the connection between impugned activities
and American territory, and other matters unrelated to particular
investors, then the factor of plaintiff's nationality is irrelevant. If
the relevant limiting factor involves qualities in the investors,
then which investors? The law is designed to regulate the Ameri-
can securities system; therefore, the plaintiffs to be protected
should be persons actually or potentially involved in that system
and consequently deserving the protection of United States laws
when injured by United States based activities. If that is the pur-
pose, nationality is still a poor guideline. True, American citizens
are more likely to participate in the American securities system
than are nonresident aliens, but past or present economic activity
by individual plaintiffs provides a more tailored measure of nexus
and one that is not administratively burdensome. Nationality, in
any event, says nothing about an individual's connection with the
American securities system.
The Bersch nationality distinction can be justified on only three
grounds: (1) American nationals are worthier of American legal
protection than aliens in situations in which the courts find the
applicability of American legislation to be tangential, (2) Ameri-
can nationality can be read to indicate a greater likelihood of eco-
nomic participation in the American securities system and
consequently justifies greater protection, or (3) the distinction re-
sults in administrative convenience or economy. Each argument
can be answered by focusing on the political function of citizen-
ship, which is its primary attribute. First, although chauvinistic
protection of the citizen is permissible under international law, it
is contrary to our tradition, which quite properly appears to be
narrowing citizenship to its political role. The broad economic
purposes of the securities laws do not suggest any congressional
policy favoring nationalistic zeal in doling out protection. Second,
the law of averages undoubtedly shows that nonresident citi-
zens as a group are more inclined to be involved with United
States securities than nonresident aliens. But the breadth of the
group will inevitably create unjust results. Third, administrative
convenience does not necessarily require such an arbitrary test.
Overall, such consequences from the use of nationality as a test
are undesirable.341
CONCLUSION
Citizenship is thus deficient as a standard for legal decision-
making. Citizenship may be acquired by disparate and unrelated
methods, including birth in the United States,342 voluntary natu-
ralization,343 accelerated naturalization because a parent 344 or
spouse345 is a citizen, birth abroad to American parents,346 or
birth abroad to an American parent plus residence in the United
States.34 7 The effect of citizenship upon members of each group
may be very different because of its acquisition by such different
routes. The assumption that those differences are not significant
should not be made when important legal consequences attached
to citizenship might be measured by more objective means.
Citizenship cannot be lost without individual acquiescence. Al-
though there plainly is merit in preventing involuntary expatria-
tion, that ruling has its greatest logic when linked to the
immigration laws and the power to deport. To the extent that citi-
zenship might play a role as a surrogate for attachment to Ameri-
can customs and traditions, the concept is overinclusive because
it assumes that all de jure citizens have such attachment.
Citizenship says little about any actual quality in the individual.
Other statuses generally signal some real quality in the individual
that justifies the legal consequence. The status of marriage tends
to engender and reflect emotional ties, as does close family rela-
tionship. Domicile suggests continuing connection to a place, at
least to the extent that there is no intent to go elsewhere. Citi-
zenship, on the other hand, only marks a past event.
Many of those who have American citizenship may feel a loy-
alty to American institutions and culture. Moreover, we have no
more accurate means than citizenship by which to determine the
341. Tenney, The Second Circuit Review: Securities, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1197,
1205 (1976) (no reason to distinguish between protected persons on nationality ba-
sis).
342. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (1) (1976).
343. Id. § 1427.
344. Id. §§ 1431 (one citizen parent), 1432 (alien parents).
345. Id. § 1430(a).
346. Id. § 1401 (a) (3).
347. Id. § 1401 (a) (7), (b).
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existence of such an attachment. To the extent that such quali-
ties are important to particular legal consequences, the use of the
citizenship standard can be applied as the only one that measures
the immeasurable. But such use should be made sparingly.
The most defensible justification for attaching a consequence to
citizenship is that other consequences traditionally attach al-
ready. For instance, lack of citizenship means that the individual
may be deported. Potential deportability may justify attaching
consequences such as denial of the right to hold public office. But
as the courts use constitutional tools to cut down rules attaching
legal consequences to citizenship, they eliminate reasons that in-
directly support still other consequences.
The use of citizenship as a standard has been shrinking, as it
should. What we will probably see is a virtual elimination of
power in the individual states to attribute consequences to citi-
zenship, except as it affects their definition of a political commu-
nity. Further, states should ignore distinctions between resident
and nonresident aliens. Although the Supreme Court equal pro-
tection cases involve only resident aliens, there is no particular
reason why the states should be permitted to regulate the rights
of nonresident aliens in a manner different from their regulation
of the rights of American citizens resident abroad.
The federal government, of course, is a different matter. Al-
though the linedrawing in Mathews v. Diaz appears a bit too
broad, it is difficult to decide where to encroach upon the federal
government's political discretion to regulate matters interwoven
with foreign affairs and to suggest a test that strikes a proper bal-
ance between individuals and the public weal. On the other hand,
when such paramount rights come into conflict with even federal
authority, there should be a reluctance to say that aliens have no
protection merely because they are nonresidents. Courts must
draw a distinction between government action which involves na-
tional security and that which does not. Citizenship is a tenuous
basis for distinctions, and bald use of it should not be favored.
Thus, the concept of naked de jure citizenship in Rexach should
not have been an acceptable tax basis; the government's disa-
vowal of citizenship should in all cases be sufficient to break the
tax lnk. Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co. is likewise an un-
fortunate decision because it permits private discrimination
against national origins to be cloaked by citizenship discrimina-
tion. To extend that reasoning to section 1981 would be doubly
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unfortunate. The utilization of citizenship as a guideline for the
interpretation of the securities laws is completely misplaced in
legislation that looks toward economic impact and bears no rela-
tionship to political status. Rather, any test used to distinguish
among potential plaintiffs should focus on the existence of an eco-
nomic connection between the United States and the protected
person, given that the prohibited act takes place within the
United States.
Citizenship may be used effectively for political distinctions and
is a necessary tool for the federal government's regulation of mat-
ters involving international relations and the entry of foreign indi-
viduals into our society. Given the imprecise nature of
citizenship, other uses of the standard are usually not justifiable.
